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Hardware security and hardware authentication have become more and more 
important concerns in the manufacture of trusted integrated circuits.  In this dissertation, 
a detailed study of hardware Trojans in analog circuits characterized by the presence of 
extra operating points or modes is presented.  In a related study, a counterfeit 
countermeasure method based upon Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) 
authentication circuits is proposed for addressing the growing proliferation of counterfeit 
integrated circuits in the supply chain.  
Most concerns about hardware Trojans in semiconductor devices are based upon 
an implicit assumption that attackers will focus on embedding Trojans in digital hardware 
by making malicious modifications to the Boolean operation of a circuit. In stark 
contrast, hardware Trojans can be easily embedded in some of the most basic analog 
circuits. In this work, a particularly insidious class of analog hardware Trojans that 
require no architectural modifications, no area or power overhead, and prior to triggering, 
that leave no signatures in any power domains or delay paths is introduced. The 
Power/Architecture/Area/Signature Transparent (PAAST) characteristics help the Trojan 
“hide” and make them very difficult to detect with existing hardware Trojan detection 
methods.  Cleverly hidden PAAST Trojans are nearly impossible to detect with the best 
simulation and verification tools, even if a full and accurate disclosure of the circuit 
schematic and layout is available.  Aside from the work of the author of this dissertation 
and her classmates, the literature is void of discussions of PAAST analog hardware 
Trojans. In this work, examples of circuits showing the existence of PAAST analog 
hardware Trojans are given, the PAAST characteristics of these types of hardware 
xv 
Trojans are discussed, and heuristic detection methods that can help to detect these 
analog hardware Trojans are proposed.  
Another major and growing problem in the modern IC supply chain is the 
proliferation of counterfeit chips that are often characterized by different or inferior 
performance characteristics and reduced reliability when compared with authentic parts. 
A counterfeit countermeasure method is proposed that should lower the entry barrier for 
major suppliers of commercial off the shelf (COTS) parts to offer authenticated 
components to the military and other customers that have high component reliability 
requirements. The countermeasure is based upon a PUF authentication circuit that 
requires no area, pin, or power overhead, and causes no degradation of performance of 
existing and future COTS components. 
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Security, dependability, and trust of electronic systems are essential in a world that is 
so dependent upon the uninterrupted world-wide operation of a globe-scale electronic 
communication and information network. Over the past several decades there have been 
numerous attempts by dubious individuals to compromise various components in this 
monstrous network. These attempts include malicious software attacks, often termed viruses, 
which result in denial of services, in stealing information, in stealing money, in destroying or 
altering valuable data, etc. The computer programs that harbor these viruses are often termed 
software Trojans. Software Trojan attacks are an ongoing problem with multiple attack 
threads running at different locations around the world every day. High levels of resources 
are continually invested to counter these attacks and constrain the impact of these attacks to a 
level that does not dramatically compromise the operation of the system. Though these 
software attacks are continuously ongoing and though they are much more than an 
annoyance, society is accustomed to functioning with these attacks and the ongoing efforts to 
minimize the impact of software Trojans actually strengthen the overall reliability and 
integrity of our cyber infrastructure. Software security will remain an area of ongoing 
research activity for the foreseeable future.     
The adversarial modification of an integrated circuit to intentionally alter the behavior 
of the circuit in some devious way introduces what is termed a “Hardware Trojan” into the 
IC. Electronic systems are also vulnerable to hardware breaches. But unlike software 
breaches which regularly occur and routinely mitigated by making software changes, 
hardware breaches can render the associated hardware permanently compromised.  If a 
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hardware Trojan were to be embedded into hardware that is widely distributed and if that 
hardware Trojan were to remain dormant for an extended period of time and then triggered, 
all hardware that contained that Trojan would be compromised.  Imagine, for example, what 
would happen if a hardware Trojan were embedded in a key hardware component that was 
common to all Apple iPhones that were sold over a period of two years and that it was 
designed to lay dormant for a two-year period. That hardware Trojan would affect close to 
500 million users when triggered and could require a hardware modification to mitigate the 
Trojan.   The impact such a Trojan could have on society would be devastating.    
In contrast to software Trojans that occur regularly, there is no documented evidence 
of a single hardware Trojan that has been successfully embedded into any integrated circuit 
that is in production today.  But numerous research works show the vulnerability that exists 
in the hardware fabric of todays’ electronic systems to the introduction of hardware Trojans.  
In contrast to the routinely encountered software Trojans which usually have a modest but 
manageable negative impact on computer system security, hardware Trojans could have a 
much more devastating impact on cyber security. For these reasons, hardware security is of 
growing concern.   
Maintaining a high level of hardware security is becoming more and more 
challenging nowadays due to the fact that there are multiple places in the normal production 
flow of an integrated circuit where hardware breaches can be inserted.  Due to globalization 
of the IC industry, the physical locations where the breaches can be inserted are distributed 
throughout the globe thereby making it even more difficult to maintain a high level of 
hardware security.   
3 
Various stages in the production flow of an IC where hardware Trojans can be 
inserted include the design, layout, fabrication, and testing stages. Outsourcing of parts of the 
design, of the fabrication, and the growing use of third-party IP increase hardware security 
risks. More research is needed on understanding the vulnerability to hardware Trojans and on 
strategies to mitigate these vulnerabilities.  
The motivation for an individual or individuals to insert hardware Trojans into one or 
more ICs may be much different than the motivation to insert software Trojans into the cyber 
network. Regardless of the motivation, inserting a Trojan is evil, illegal and disruptive.   
Hackers may view the insertion of software Trojans as a challenge and a distorted way to 
demonstrate cleverness to their peers. Others may insert software Trojans for financial gain 
or possibly for political gains. In contrast, it is highly unlikely that hackers will have either 
the knowledge or access needed to target insertion of hardware Trojans.  The profile of the 
most likely hardware hacker that would be in a position to insert a hardware Trojan is an 
experienced and trusted design or process engineer with a high-level of access to the design 
and/or production process.   Though it is possible that the person could be a disgruntled or 
deranged employee, it would more likely be a person that was highly trained and strategically 
placed by an adversary with a long-term goal of being in a position to insert the hardware 
Trojan.  And unlike perpetuators that insert software Trojans that may be difficult to identify, 
it is highly likely that the identity of those responsible for inserting a hardware Trojan would 
be quickly determined once the hardware Trojan is activated. For these reasons, a perpetuator 
that would be in a position to insert a hardware Trojan will be referred to as an adversary. A 
trusted individual in a company that actually works to sabotage the output is often termed a 
“mole”.    
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Most concerns about hardware Trojans in semiconductor devices are based upon an 
implicit assumption that adversaries will target embedding hardware Trojans in the digital 
hardware of an IC and the Trojan will be a malicious modification of the Boolean operation 
of the circuit. Invariably these hardware Trojans require a modification or generally an 
addition of some components into the circuit and during normal operation of the circuit, the 
presence of these Trojans introduce signatures in power supply domains, signatures or timing 
changes in signal paths of the circuit, and/or delays of signals propagating in the circuit.  
Efforts to thwart hardware Trojans are often associated with identifying architectural 
modifications, trigger mechanisms, the presence of payloads, or through side channel 
analysis by observing signatures in the power bus or delay paths that differ from what is 
expected in a Trojan-free circuit [1]-[5]. Correspondingly, there are few reported concerns in 
the trust and security communities about the vulnerability of analog circuits to the malicious 
insertion of hardware Trojans. Unfortunately, analog hardware Trojans can be easily inserted 
in some of the most basic analog circuits [6],[7] , they can be easily triggered, they can carry 
devastating payloads, and they can be extremely difficult to detect.  
 Although analog hardware Trojans could be introduced by incorporating additional 
analog circuitry or altering a design, existing methods of hardware Trojan detection can be 
adapted to help thwart such Trojan insertions.   However, existing methods are not effective 
at detecting a Trojan that is embedded as an extra state or operating mode that may be 
inherent in what may appear to be a well-designed circuit. Hardware Trojans served by the 
extra undesired state or operating mode are power/ area/ architecture/signature transparent.  
Prior to triggering such a circuit to operate in the undesired state or mode, which will be 
termed the Trojan state or the Trojan mode, the circuit will not demonstrate any abnormal 
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signatures. Thus, all existing hardware Trojan detection methods which depend upon 
identifying alterations in the circuit structure or abnormal signatures in electrical 
characteristics during normal operation will fail to detect this kind of Trojan.  
In this dissertation, a type of analog hardware Trojans that are embedded as extra 
operating states or modes in an analog circuit will be discussed. These Trojans require no 
additional power, no architectural modifications, no area changes, and, prior to triggering, 
leave no signatures in the power bus or delay paths. These Trojans will be descriptively 
termed PAAST Trojans because they are Power/Area/Architecture and Signature 
Transparent. And, of the moles that design the PAAST Trojans make them stealthy, these 
Trojans will also invariably escape detection through the design and verification steps with 
the best existing simulation and verification tools even if full and accurate disclosure of the 
entire circuit schematic and layout is available. 
Another major and growing problem in the modern IC supply chain is the 
proliferation of counterfeit chips [8]. Driven by financial incentives, unscrupulous enterprises 
insert these chips into the supply chain in a variety of ways, such as recycling used chips 
from disassembled boards, remarking inferior components, manufacturing unauthorized 
wafers, or even designing chips with similar but meaningfully different characteristics.  
There are conflicting estimates of the size of the counterfeit IC market. This is not surprising 
since considerable effort is often required to determine if an IC has been counterfeited. One 
report [9] out of ST Microelectronics in Europe suggested that in 2011 it was around 1% of 
semiconductor sales and another report [10][11] from the International Trade Administration 
of the US Department of Commerce report it around 5% of semiconductor sales in the same 
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year. But there is no disagreement that the counterfeit IC market is growing rapidly and that 
it is a large market. 
Chip counterfeiting has not yet reached the level needed to provide the impetus for 
major chip manufacturers to address the problem because the revenue loss as a percent of 
sales is still relatively low and because producers of high volume consumer electronic 
equipment do not demand high reliability components from the semiconductor supply chain. 
However, counterfeit components that perform differently or that are not reliable can cause 
catastrophic problems when they find their way into military systems, transportation systems, 
precision healthcare, or other applications where a high level of reliability is essential. It is 
well known that Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be used for providing low-cost 
IC authentication. The PUFs add a unique identity (e.g. fingerprint) to each integrated circuit. 
Circuit-based PUFs rely on the inherent manufacturing variability of the physical 
characteristics of silicon to generate the unique fingerprints for each IC [12]-[15]. The major 
semiconductor manufacturers of COTS parts are, however, reluctant to add authentication 
circuits to their integrated circuits primarily due to concerns about increased die area, 
increased pin count, and concerns about potential interference with the intended operation of 
a circuit [16]. If the entry barrier for including authentication capabilities can be sufficiently 
lowered, including authentication as a standard part of the COTS production flow can add 
financial incentives for manufacturers to address the counterfeit IC problem. Demanding 
customers, such as the transportation industry, financial organizations, and the military would 
then have access to parts with a very low counterfeit rate.   
In this dissertation, a detailed study of PAAST analog hardware Trojans is presented. 
Prototype circuits that are designed to harbor PAAST Trojans both as undesired static 
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operating states and undesired dynamic modes of operation are presented. Characteristics of 
the PAAST Trojans are discussed along with stealthy triggering mechanism. Methods for 
detecting the presence of some types of PAAST analog Trojans are introduced. A PUF-based 
under-circuit designed without any extra pins or interaction with the COTS IC is proposed 
for IC authentication. 
1.2 Dissertation Organization 
A discussion about the existence of undesired static operating points and undesired 
dynamic modes of operation in the circuit along with a discussion of how they serve as 
hardware Trojans appears in Chapter 2. The vulnerability of circuits to the presence of 
multiple operating points or modes along with general characteristic of PAAST circuits is 
discussed in Chapter 2. Several basic circuits with embedded PAAST Trojans that can serve 
as benchmarks and example circuits with three different temperature signature characteristics 
are introduced in Chapter 2. Circuits with multiple stationary dynamic modes of operation 
where the undesired mode of operation are deviations in amplitude, frequency, and phase are 
also discussed. 
In Chapter 3, detection methods for verifying the existence of PAAST Trojans are 
proposed. Included is a temperature sweeping method that is compatible with basic 
simulation tools. A method that can be used to identify the presence or absence of stationary 
dynamic Trojan operating modes based upon the phase-plane characteristics of dynamic 
circuits is presented in Chapter 3.  
Side channel trigger mechanisms that serve as PAAST triggers for dynamic circuits 
are discussed in Chapter 4 along with measurement results for discrete-component 
implementations of these circuits. 
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 The implementation of a PUF-based IC authentication approach appears in Chapter 
5. It is based upon an under-circuit that generates a unique key for each IC.   
Chapter 6 comprises a conclusion of this work. 
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CHAPTER 2.    PAAST HARDWARE TROJANS IN ANALOG CIRCUITS 
The PAAST Trojans can be easily embedded in many commonly used analog circuits 
such as voltage/current reference generators, temperature sensors, phase-locked loops, 
oscillators and clock generators, data converters, amplifiers, power management circuits, and 
a wide variety of filters. And, because of the area, power, and signature transparency, in 
addition to escaping detection during design and verification, almost all existing methods of 
hardware Trojan detection will fail to detect these Trojans.  Since the PAAST Trojans can be 
easily inserted into some of the most basic analog blocks and since they are extremely 
difficult to detect, the analog circuitry must be viewed as fertile ground for the adversarial 
insertion of insidious hardware Trojans. 
The hardware Trojan discussed in this dissertation is characterized by the presence of 
extra equilibrium states or extra stationary dynamic operating modes.  The extra states or 
extra modes are undesired and if operation is forced into the undesired state or mode, the 
Trojan is said to be triggered.  Vulnerability of a circuit to harboring these Trojans is based 
upon an open problem in the mathematics and computer science communities. Qualitatively, 
this problem can be summarized by the observation that there are no known methods for 
obtaining all solutions of a finite set of constrained nonlinear differential equations in finite 
time [17]-[21]. And, even with the small set of equations that characterize some simple 
analog circuits with only a few devices, such as those commonly used in voltage/current 
reference generators, temperature sensors, … , there are no known methods for even 
determining if all the existing solutions for these circuits in an efficient time.  But, just 
because there are no known methods for determining if a nonlinear circuit has more than one 
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solution, likely most useful nonlinear circuits have only a single solution and thus will not 
harbor a PAAST Trojan.   
The open problem that provides cover for PAAST Trojans is based on the possible 
presence of more than one solution to a set of nonlinear equations where an undesired 
solution corresponds to a Trojan state.   Invariably the set of nonlinear static circuit equations 
come from nonlinear circuits that incorporate energy storage elements and thus the nonlinear 
equations are also dependent upon time.  The solutions of a static nonlinear circuit can be 
separated into two mutually exclusive groups.  One group corresponds to those static 
solutions (also termed “dc equilibrium points” or simply “equilibrium points”) that 
correspond to a stationary solution of the time-dependent circuit and the other group 
corresponds to a non-stationary solution of the time-dependent circuit.  The stationary 
solutions are termed “stable equilibria” by some authors.  Those dc equilibrium points that 
are not stationary are termed “quasi-stable” operating points.   PAAST Trojans in the static 
operation of a circuit are associated with the presence of one or more undesired stationary 
solutions.  DC equilibrium points that are quasi-stable do not harbor Trojans since the circuit 
will always drift away from solutions that are not stable equilibria.  In the control systems 
community, relationships between stability, metastability, and instability and the 
corresponding static solutions of a set of nonlinear equations are often discussed but this 
formalization is not germane to the results presented in this dissertation.          
  Some specific nonlinear circuit structures are known for supporting more than one 
stationary solution.   One of the most commonly used circuits in all of electronics has three 
dc equilibrium points, two of which are stationary equilibrium points with the third solution 
being a quasi-stable equilibrium point.  That circuit is the four-transistor two-inverter latch.   
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In the case of the two-inverter latch, which will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section, the two stationary equilibrium points are actually both desired operating points with 
one representing the Boolean “0” value and the other representing the Boolean “1” value.  By 
adding a small amount of control circuitry, the user can force operation into either of the two 
stationary states.  It can be observed that for useful implementations, the circuit structure of 
the basic two-inverter latch incorporates a positive feedback loop in the small-signal linear 
circuit schematic when both inverters are operating in the vicinity of the quasi-stable 
operating point.  This simple example shows that the existence of multiple stationary 
equilibrium points for a nonlinear circuit is not inherently bad and, to the contrary, can be 
very useful.  But if a circuit has an undesired stationary equilibrium point and if the presence 
of that undesired stationary equilibrium point is difficult to recognize and causes undesired 
behavior of the circuit, then the undesired stationary solution can be viewed as a Trojan state 
or Trojan mode of operation.    
Numerous authors have expressed interest in developing strategies for determining 
whether a circuit has more than one stationary solution.  Willson [62] showed that for circuits 
comprised of bipolar transistors, resistors, and independent sources, a necessary condition for 
the existence of bistable solutions is the presence of at least two transistors along with a 
specific type of feedback structure in the circuit.  In subsequent work [22], he showed that 
“all circuits constructed by interconnecting, in an arbitrary manner, two bipolar transistors 
and an arbitrary number of resistors and independent sources, posses, at most three dc 
equilibrium points”.   Goldgeisser and Green [30] observed that at least some of the results 
for circuits with bipolar transistors do not extend to circuits with MOS transistors by 
providing an example of a circuit with two MOS transistors that has five equilibrium points.  
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Inoue and colleagues [23] stated “…it is known that, when the circuit has positive feedback 
loops, it may have multiple solutions” though it is not clear that they correctly interpreted the 
referenced literature.  But what these and other authors have observed is that some type of 
feedback is present in transistor circuits that have more than one equilibrium point.  The 
author of this work is not aware of the existence of any transistor circuits without a feedback 
path that have more than one equilibrium point.   
But making statements about the relationship between the presence of more than one 
equilibrium point in transistor circuits and the presence of an associated feedback path is 
complicated by what appears to be the lack of a consensus on how feedback itself is defined.  
The concept of feedback has been used for centuries in the design of mechanical systems and 
it has been formally used for over 100 years in the electrical and electronic circuits’ field.   In 
the electronics field, invariably the feedback in a circuit is discussed in the context of a block 
diagram or a graphical representation of a circuit and both representations suppress 
information about the circuit.  Further, multiple block diagrams and multiple graphical 
representations are common for a given circuit and consequently multiple feedback 
representations of a circuit are possible.  Even after a block diagram or a graphical 
representation is obtained, there are different ways that a feedback loop can be defined.   
Feedback is often characterized as being “positive” or “negative” and even these terms are 
not uniquely defined for a given circuit.  As such, making a general rigorous statement 
relating the presence or absence of multiple equilibrium points in a circuit to a feedback 
structure is challenging and beyond the scope of this work.     Without formally defining 
feedback, positive feedback, or negative feedback, conventional wisdom relating to the 
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relationship between the presence or absence of multiple stationary equilibrium points in a 
transistor circuit can be summarized by the statement 
 “A necessary but not sufficient requirement for the existence of more than one 
stationary equilibrium points in a transistor circuit is the presence of at least two transistors 
and at least one positive feedback loop”. 
  With this understanding, all transistor circuits with two or more transistors and at 
least one positive feedback loop will be classified as being vulnerable to the harboring 
PAAST Trojans.  Correspondingly, transistor circuits with only one transistor or with two or 
more transistors but no positive feedback loops are not vulnerable to harboring a PAAST 
Trojan.  
Even a PAAST vulnerable circuit that is designed well with only one operating point 
can often be modified by simply changing some device sizes in such a way that the desired 
operating mode is maintained but an additional stationary equilibrium point that carries the 
Trojan is introduced and this additional operating mode can be extremely difficult to detect 
[25].  And, with this modification, the circuit may still perform well when operating at the 
desired equilibrium point.   Another interesting but troublesome characteristic of some 
PAAST vulnerable circuits is that they can be designed in such a way that supply voltage or 
operating temperature changes add one or more Trojan states.    
2.1 The Existence of Multiple States in Analog Circuits  
2.1.1 The vulnerability of multiple operating points/modes in analog circuits 
It is widely known that a circuit comprised of two back-to-back connected inverters, 
shown Figure 2-1, is often intentionally designed so that it is bi-stable.  If designed to be bi-
stable, the two stationary equilibrium points can be designated by the Boolean values of “0” 
and “1”.  As shown in the figure, the circuit has no inputs and two outputs labeled as Q and 
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Q’.  Q will take the value which happens to be when it is powered up. For example, if Q=’0’ 
when the circuit is powered on, then Q’=‘1’. Correspondingly, if Q=’1’ when powered on, 
then Q’=‘0’. When designed to be bistable, the circuit has three equilibrium points. Two of 
these are stationary (alternatively stable), and one is quasi-stable. When operating near the 
quasi-stable operating point, the back to back connected inverters form a positive feedback 
loop.  
An implementation of this circuit was designed in an IBM 0.13 um CMOS process.  
In this implementation, the inverters were comprised of the standard two-transistor 
architecture with an n-channel pull-down device and a p-channel pull-up device. The break-
loop continuation method discussed in [26] can be used to obtain the equilibrium points.  
When the dc input impedance at the break point in the loop is infinite, the issue of loop 
loading when breaking the loop for determining static operating points is not of concern.  
Since the dc input impedance of the CMOS inverters is infinite, the loop can be broken at 
either the input of INV1 or the input of INV2.  In Fig. 2-2 (a) the loop has been broken at the 
input to INV2.   The loop transfer characteristics (often termed the return map) of the 
relationship between VOUT and VIN are shown in the figure. With the break-loop method, the 
equilibrium points of the circuit are at the intersection in the VOUT:VIN plane of the loop 
transfer characteristics VOUT and the line showing VIN.   Simulation results showing the 
return map and the VIN line for an implementation of this circuit are shown in Figure 2-2  (b).  
As expected, it can be observed that there are three intersection points.  Points A and C are 
the two stationary equilibrium points and point B is a quasi-stable equilibrium point.   
The stable and quasi-stable operating points can be compared to those of a ball on a 
symmetrical hill as shown in Figure 2-2(c) [27]. As described in Figure 2-2(c), ‘A’ and ‘C’ 
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are two stable operating points while ‘B’ is a quasi-stable operating point. For both the two-
inverter loop and the “ball-on-the-hill” analogy, any slightly deviation from the quasi-stable 
operating point will cause the output to go to one of the two stable operating points if the 
time-dependent dynamics are included in the system models.  
Sometimes the quasi-stable operating point is referred to as an unstable operating 
point.  In the case of the two-inverter loop, the quasi-stable operating point in the static 

























Figure 2-2 Three operating points exist in the back to back connected inverters 
The back to back connected inverter circuit is intentionally designed to take 
advantage of the two stationary equilibria that can be used to store Boolean data.  However, 
in some other circuits which are designed to operate at only one state but that may be 
unintentionally bistable or even have more than one additional stationary equilibrium point, 
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the extra state or states  can be viewed as a Trojan state or states  in the circuit.  When 
operating in a Trojan state, the performance of the circuit may differ substantially from what 
is desired.  
The existence of multiple equilibrium points in many nonlinear circuits is a 
mathematical property of these systems.  Furthermore, multiple solutions can exist for some 
sets of nonlinear equations that arise in even relatively simple transistor circuits.  This 
nonlinearity is inherently inherited from the nonlinearity of transistors.  Cover for Trojans is 
embedded in the open problem that can be simply stated as “There is no known method for 
obtaining all solutions for a set of nonlinear equations in finite time”.  One might be tempted 
to argue that a good circuit simulator, such as SPICE or SPECTRE, or an equation solver in a 
program such as MATLAB could be used to obtain the solutions of a circuit.  Unfortunately, 
these simulators or other computational tools only provide a single solution and their 
capabilities are inherently limited by the unsolved open problem of finding all solutions of a 
set of nonlinear equations.  Consequently, if a nonlinear circuit has an undesired stationary 
equilibrium point that serves as a Trojan, it may escape detection in both the design and 
verification steps involved in the production of integrated circuits.   
Even if only one state exists with the designed device sizes, nominal process 
parameters, nominal supply voltage, and nominal operating temperature, multiple states may 
still exist if changes occur in process parameters, supply voltages, or temperature. In the back 
to back connected inverters, the circuit is invariably designed so that two stationary operating 
points exist across worst-case variations in process, temperature, or supply voltage. Some 
good analog circuit designers who may also be Trojan creators may create a Trojan that 
would only have an undesired operating state for a specific supply voltage range or 
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temperature range.  Such a circuit would pass all simulation and test criterion except when 
operating in the specific range but would still contain the Trojan. Since the undesired 
operating state would exist only for specific conditions, the simulator or other test tools 
would not detect it unless simulated/tested under the specific conditions. Furthermore, even if 
the circuit was simulated/tested under the vulnerable conditions, the undesired stationary 
operating state would only appear if it were specifically triggered.  Unless the undesired 
operating state was present and triggered, there would be no abnormal signatures in any 
power domains or timing paths.  Once this kind of Trojan is inserted into a circuit, it can be 
very difficult to detect.  
Up to this point, emphasis has been placed on the static performance of a circuit and 
on the presence or absence of undesired stationary operating points.   All integrated circuits 
also have energy storage elements embedded in the circuits.  Often these energy storage 
elements are primarily parasitic capacitors, but parasitic inductors and non-parasitic 
capacitors and inductors are often present as well.  When transistors are present, the 
nonlinearities in the transistors create nonlinear dynamic systems and these can be 
mathematically characterized with a set of nonlinear differential equations.  If the time-
dependence of the energy stored on the energy storage elements is neglected, this set of 
nonlinear differential equations can be reduced to a set of nonlinear static equations.  Much 
like a set of nonlinear static equations, there are no known methods for obtaining all solutions 
for a set of nonlinear dynamic equations.   But in contrast to the solutions of a set of 
nonlinear static equations which are points in a real number space, solutions of a set of 
nonlinear differential equations may be points in a real number space or may be time-
dependent signals such as those that may come from waveform generators.  The solutions 
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become even more complex if the inputs to a set of nonlinear differential equations are time-
varying.   But like the static operation of a nonlinear circuit, undesired stationary solutions of 
a nonlinear dynamic circuit may exist, and these solutions can be dramatically different from 
the desired solutions. And much like the static operation of a circuit, the undesired dynamic 
modes of operation can be viewed as the results of a Trojan in the dynamic operation of a 
circuit.   And since the presence of undesired dynamic modes of operation can be created 
without affecting power, area, or circuit structure or without leaving any signatures in any 
power domains or signal paths, the Trojans that create the undesired dynamic modes of 
operation can also be termed PAAST Trojans.   
In some digital Trojan related papers, reference is made to using analog circuits as a 
part of a trigger mechanism or as a payload [28].  The analog properties or additional analog 
circuits are used to change the signal or some delay characteristics, thus changing the 
Boolean output signal of the digital circuits.  In [28], mention is also made of creating analog 
Trojans though no details are presented.  Other authors have suggested creating analog 
Trojans by modifying or adding components to an analog circuit.  Much like most digital 
Trojans that are discussed, such analog Trojans would alter circuit structure, layout area, and 
likely leave traces of their presence in some power domains or signal paths.    
2.1.2 The identification of circuits with positive feedback loops  
Trajkovic [29] and Green [30]  observed that circuits with multiple equilibrium points 
also have feedback loops and under certain conditions, the presence of at least one feedback 
loop is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a transistor circuit to have more than one 
stable equilibrium point.  Following the conventional wisdom stated previously, circuits with 
one or more positive feedback loops are vulnerable to the existence of multiple stationary 
equilibrium points.  Thus, a method for identifying circuits that are vulnerable to the presence 
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of multiple stationary equilibrium points comprises identifying if at least one positive 
feedback loop is present in the circuit. And circuits without any feedback loops or with only 
negative feedback loops are not vulnerable to harboring a PAAST Trojan. 
In [22], Willson shows that a circuit with two cross-coupled bipolar transistors 
creating a feedback loop is vulnerable to the existence of more than one operating points. 
Although Willson does not classify this cross-coupled feedback as “positive feedback”, the 
specific cross-coupling is typically viewed as positive feedback.  Though the term “positive 
feedback” in the context of circuits is widely used, a rigorous well-accepted definition of a 
positive feedback loop in a circuit appears to be lacking in the literature.  Some authors have 
made mappings of a circuit to a graph and defined feedback loops and positive feedback 
loops in the corresponding graph. However, there are multiple mappings of circuits to graphs 
that have been used for various purposes and mapping a circuit to a graph invariably results 
in a loss of circuit information, thus raising questions about whether information relating to 
feedback or more specifically positive feedback is retained in a specific graphical 
representation. 
A systematic positive feedback loop identification method was proposed in [31]. In 
this approach, a circuit with passive components, diodes, independent sources, and MOS 
transistors was mapped to a signed directed dependency graph (DDG).  Each directed 
dependency is assigned a value of either “positive” or “negative”. By using graph theory 
concepts and the dependencies between “branch currents” and “controlling voltages” which 
are defined in [31], positive feedback loops can be identified.  A positive feedback loop is a 
loop with an even number greater than or equal to 2 of negative dependencies.   Circuits with 
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one or more positive feedback loops in their signed DDG are said to be vulnerable to 






















Figure 2-3 Loop identification on Wilson circuit; (a) Wilson circuit; (b) one positive 
feedback loop and one negative feedback loop 
A Wilson bias generator circuit is shown in Figure 2-3 (a). By using the method 
introduced in [31], two loops are identified in the corresponding DDG as shown with dashed 
and solid lines in the node link diagram of Figure 2-3 (b). Since the number of the negative 
signs associated with the loop AI1BI2 is an even number, it is a positive feedback 
loop.  Correspondingly, since the number of the negative signs associated with the loop 
CI1BI2C is an odd number, it is a negative feedback loop.  The DDG for the 
Wilson circuit has only one positive feedback loop, thus, the break-loop continuation method 
can be used to find all operating points. Since the number of equilibrium points may be 
temperature dependent, it is necessary to do the break-loop analysis at all temperatures that 










































































Figure 2-4 Loop identification circuits with two or more positive feedback loops (a) bandgap 
circuit with self-basing circuit; (b) node-link diagram for DDG of the circuit in (a)showing 
positive feedback loop; (c) bandgap circuit with cascode self-basing circuit; (d) node-link 
diagram for DDG of circuit in (c) showing positive feedback loop 
Circuits with multiple positive feedback loops or coupled feedback loops can also be 
identified by the method introduced in [31]. Example circuits with multiple positive feedback 
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loops include some self-biased bandgap generators. Two bandgap circuits with different self-
biased circuits are shown in Figure 2-4. The identification of positive feedback loops in the 
DDG of the circuits in Figure 2-4 (a) and Figure 2-4(c) are shown in the node-link diagrams 
in Figure 2-4 (b) and Figure 2-4(d), respectively.  The two graphs are simplified to show only 
positive feedback loops and node voltage dependencies. As shown in Figure 2-4 (b), the 
circuit in Figure 2-4 (a) has two positive feedback loops, and the loop ABVoVi-A 
has one directional dependency from loop EFE.  The circuit in Figure 2-4 (c) is a 
modified version of circuit in Figure 2-4 (a). In Figure 2-4 (c), the biasing circuit has a 
cascode structure and the ‘Vref’ of the bandgap circuit is connected to the gate of the cascode 
transistors, which generates one more positive feedback loop as shown in Figure 2-4 (d). The 
positive feedback loops of the circuit in Figure 2-4 (c) are coupled together and more 
complex. To verify the presence of multiple equilibrium points on these circuits by breaking 
loop method, multiple nodes need to be broken. The high dimensional computation makes 
the breaking loop method not practical or inefficient on circuits with two or more positive 
feedback loops, not to say to obtain the temperature range where multiple equilibrium points 
exist. 
2.2 Benchmark of PAAST hardware Trojans in analog circuits 
Analog circuits are circuits in which the continuous-values of voltages and current are 
of interest in contrast to digital circuits where the variables of interest are typically associated 
with one of two discrete levels.   Analog circuits are often built with resistors, inductors, 
capacitors, MOS transistors, and bipolar transistors. Amplifiers, reference generators, 
oscillators, filters, and other important and fundamental circuits are classified as analog 
circuits. In analog circuits that include transistors, nonlinearity is almost unavoidable due to 
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the inherent nonlinearity of the transistors themselves. Nonlinearities can also be introduced 
through the nonideal characteristics of actual resistors, inductors, and capacitors.   
It is known that circuits with positive feedback loops in the DDG are vulnerable to 
multiple equilibrium points.   Positive feedback loops exist in many commonly used basic 
analog circuits such as reference generators, temperature sensors, self-stabilized bias 
generators, and some power management circuits.  It is also known that some nonlinear 
analog circuit supports more than one stationary dynamic mode of operation.  Multiple 
dynamic modes of operation have been reported in several types of analog circuits including 
filters, PLLs, oscillators.  These multiple dynamic modes of operation are inherently 
associated with the nonlinearity of devices as well.  Though there has been some work 
reported on identifying vulnerability of a static circuit to the presence of undesired stable 
equilibrium points, specifically relating to architectures that have positive feedback loops in a 
corresponding DDG, there is little in the literature that focuses on the vulnerability to the 
presence of multiple stationary dynamic modes of operation.  However, as examples show, 
nonlinear analog circuits can also support undesired dynamic modes of operation and these 
circuits are also PAAST.  In this section, several example circuits will be presented that 
support either multiple static modes of operation or multiple dynamic modes of operation.    
These will serve as benchmark circuits that are useful for studying characteristics of, 
vulnerability to, and methods of preventing the introduction of PAAST   Trojans into useful 
analog circuits.    
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2.2.1 Analog hardware Trojans in static circuits 
2.2.1.1 Analog hardware Trojan in Inverse Widlar circuit 
A circuit shown in Figure 2-3(a) can be used as a bias current reference generator is 
discussed in [32]. This is often termed the Wilson bias generator.  It possesses a single 
positive feedback loop in the DDG and the Trojan which can be inserted into this circuit has 
the PAAST properties. This will serve as the first benchmark circuit. In some 
implementations, it exhibits two stable equilibrium modes over a designer-controlled 
temperature range. The undesired stable equilibrium point can be a Trojan state and can be 
very difficult to detect since it may be present only over a limited temperature range. In [33], 
the existence of multiple stable equilibrium points in the inverse Widlar circuit, which is 
often used as a voltage reference generator or temperature sensor, is discussed. This circuit is 






Figure 2-5 Inverse Widlar circuit 
In both of these benchmark circuits, with only a small change in component values, 
the temperature ranges where Trojan equilibrium points exist can change from a wide range 
to a very narrow range. A detailed discussion of temperature signatures of circuits with 
multiple equilibrium points is presented in Chapter 2.4. 
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2.2.1.2 Analog hardware Trojan in Bandgap circuit 
Much like the circuits in [32]-[33], the commonly used bandgap reference generator 
circuit of Figure 2-6, first published by Banba [34],  can have two stable equilibrium points if 
an effective start-up circuit is not included.  This will serve as the third benchmark circuit.   















Figure 2-6 Bandgap reference circuit 
Though originally proposed for operation at low supply voltages, the Banba reference 
can be designed to provide a wide range of nominal output voltages.  An implementation of 
this circuit in the 0.5u ON CMOS process designed to operate with a Vref  of 1.25V using 
the components listed in Figure 2-6 was designed.  Simulation results obtained from a bi-
directional temperature sweep, which is explained in more detail in Chapter 3, are shown in 
Figure 2-7. These simulation results show a hysteresis window in the temperature domain 
over the 70 ̊C to 200 ̊C interval. Over this interval the circuit has two stable equilibrium 
points, one is the desired operating point at approximately 1.25V and the other is a Trojan 
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operating point at a very low output voltage.  Even if the circuit is operating at the desired 
output, it can be triggered to the Trojan state either intentionally or accidentally.  As can be 
seen from the simulation results, the circuit actually has three solutions over the 70 ̊C to 
200 ̊C interval with the intermediate point corresponding to the asterisk line being an 
unstable equilibrium point.  Irrespective of whether the undesired stable operating point at a 
given temperature is inserted accidentally or intentionally by designers, the operation of the 
circuit at the undesired operating point is dramatically different from that at the desired 
equilibrium point.   
 
Figure 2-7 Operating points of bandgap reference circuit VS temperature 
The existence of the undesired operating point in the Banba bandgap circuit, as well 
as several other well-known bandgap circuits, is well known and “start-up” circuits are often 
used to remove the undesired equilibrium state. However, since the multiple operating points 
are process, voltage, and temperature (PVT) dependent, it is often not easy to verify the 
robustness of some start-up circuits.  In only slightly more complicated circuits, it can be 
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difficult to even recognize that the circuit may have multiple stable equilibrium points and it 
is these circuits that are vulnerable to the adversarial insertion of Trojan analog states.   
In static analog circuits with PAAST Trojans, the payload is often viewed as 
operation of the circuit at an undesired stable equilibrium point.  If the bandgap circuit in 
Figure 2-6 serves as the reference for the ramp waveform generator shown in Figure 2-8, the 
payload associated with a multi-stage Trojan in the bandgap circuit is a change in the 



































Figure 2-8 one ramp oscillator circuit 
The waveform generator circuit is comprised of three blocks, a bandgap circuit, a 
reset integrator, and a Schmitt trigger circuit. The ‘Vref’ of the bandgap circuit is temperature 
insensitive, and it is used as a bias voltage to generate a constant current in M1.  The bandgap 
circuit is referenced to ground instead of VSS and thus for appropriate values of VSS will 
generate two different non-zaro bias currents in the reset integrator depending upon which 
state the bandgap circuit is operating in.  The Schmitt trigger circuit has a hysteresis window 
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which is bounded by two voltages V1 and V2 (VSS<V1<V2) .  When the input voltage 
‘VOUTramp’ of the Schmitt trigger is lower than V1, M12 is off and the current mirror output 
in the integrator will charge CRAMP linearly until the voltage on the capacitor reaches to V2. 
When the input signal of the Schmitt trigger increases to V2, the gate voltage of M12 will go 
high and cause transistor M12 to dischargeCRAMP.  If the transistor M12 has a low ON 
impedance, the discharge will be rapid and VOUTramp will drop quickly to VSS.  The drop in  
VOUTramp  will reset the Schmitt trigger and the process will repeat thus resulting in a saw 
tooth periodical waveform on  VOUTramp  . The oscillating signal’s magnitude and frequency 
are determined by V1, V2, CRAMP , and the two values of Ibias.   
If the difference between ‘Gnd’ and ‘VSS’ is sufficiently small, one of the values of 
Ibias will be 0 and when the circuit operates in this mode, oscillation will cease.  Thus, 
depending on the value of VSS, the extra stationary mode of operation can be either a 
different oscillating frequency or an extra static operating state.  
Simulation results for an implementation of this circuit in the same 0.5u ON CMOS 
process and using the bandgap bias generator of Figure 2-6, operating at 75̊C with supply 
voltages of VDD=5V and VSS=0V, are shown in Figure 2-9.   For this implementation, the 
circuit has two stationary modes of operation.  One is the desired saw ramp oscillating mode 
which has an oscillation frequency of 2.82 KHz and the other is the Trojan state 
corresponding to an undesired constant static operating state. 
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Figure 2-9 The desired ramp oscillating state and one static Trojan state 
Thus, in this example, the payload of the Trojan for sufficiently negative values of 
VSS would be a second undesired operating frequency or for less negative values of VSS, the 
payload would be failure of the oscillator to oscillate.   In the latter case, depending upon the 
application, the payload could be viewed as a denial of service.  But in either case, when 
reset, the desired mode of operation would resume.   
2.2.2 Analog hardware Trojans in second-order dynamic circuits 
The benchmark circuits introduced in the previous section can all harbor a Trojan in 
the static operation of the circuit.  But as the previous example showed, a Trojan static mode 
of operation of a subcircuit can also affect the dynamic performance of a circuit.  However, 
the dynamic performance of a circuit can also be altered with a PAAST Trojan more directly 
without having multiple static modes of operation in a subcircuit. The equations 
characterizing the operation of a circuit can be static nonlinear or time-differential nonlinear 
equations.  The solutions of sets of nonlinear static equations are often termed static 
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equilibrium points.  Correspondingly, the solutions of sets of nonlinear time-differential 
equations can be either static equilibrium points or dynamic modes of operation.  
Similar to the multiple operating points that can exist in static nonlinear analog 
circuits, multiple stationary operating modes can also exist in the dynamic nonlinear circuits.  
One such example is an analog filter circuit that has two stationary dynamic outputs with 
different amplitudes for one fixed periodic input signal.   Another example is an oscillator 
circuit that has two stationary oscillating states with different amplitudes or different 
frequencies. The undesired modes of operation in dynamic nonlinear circuits are also termed 
Trojan modes.  
Transient simulations with standard circuit simulators can help designers observe 
dynamic modes of operation of a nonlinear circuit. However, simulators invariably provide 
only one operating mode with a single transient simulation. The mode of operation provided 
by the simulator for a transient simulation is determined primarily by the initial conditions set 
at the beginning of the simulation or possibly, on occasion, by other circuit components or 
elements that “numerically” couple into the transient equation solver. Trojan dynamic modes 
of operation in a circuit can be very difficult to observe with a standard transient simulation 
and often require setting initial conditions very close to an operating mode in the Trojan 
operating mode of the circuit. Even if it is known that a Trojan operating mode exists, it can 
be difficult to verify the mode with transient simulations unless appropriate initial conditions 
are set.  And, the problem of finding a dynamic Trojan operating mode or Trojan operating 
modes can be even more challenging if it is not known whether or not one or more Trojan 
operating modes actually exist.  In the following section, examples of Trojans in dynamic 
nonlinear circuits that can serve as benchmarks will be given. Much like the vulnerability to 
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embedding static Trojan states in basic static analog circuits, Trojan dynamic operating 
modes with PAAST characteristics can be easily embedded. 















Figure 2-10 Wein bridge oscillator 
The Wein bridge oscillator has been used for decades.  The basic Wein bridge 
oscillator contains one OPAMP, four resistors, and two capacitors as shown in Figure 2-10. 
The OPAMP and the resistors R1’ and R2’ form a finite gain amplifier.  Any oscillator 
circuit requires a nonlinear component to control the oscillation amplitude and spectral 
performance.   In the Wein bridge oscillator, diodes or transistors are widely used to add 
some nonlinearity to the finite gain amplifier subcircuit.  Transistors are often used in the 
SOC level designs for adding the nonlinearity whereas diodes are often used in board-level 
designs. Similar to the multiple static states that may exist in static nonlinear circuits, 
multiple dynamic modes may occur in nonlinear dynamic circuits under some specific 
feedback conditions.   In the Wein Bridge oscillator, the path containing the capacitors and 
the two resistors R1 and R2 form a feedback path to the non-inverting input of the OPAMP.   
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The feedback factor of the finite-gain amplifier can be defined by Equation  (2-1) 







                                                                    (2-1) 




 .  If the operational amplifier is ideal 
and if  R1=R2=R and C1=C2=C, the characteristic equation for the Wein bridge oscillator is 
given by Equation (2-2). 
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If    is smaller than 
1
3
 (correspondingly the gain K is larger than 3), there are 
complex-conjugate poles in the right half-plane, which makes the circuit unstable and thus 




 (correspondingly K is less than 3) , the poles are in the left half-plane and the 
circuit is stable.  But the OPAMP is not ideal and essentially all OPAMPs will saturate when 
the outputs approach VDD or VSS.   If the finite amplifier gain is very linear and modestly 
larger than 3 before saturation at VDD and VSS, the circuit will oscillate and have one 
oscillation mode but with severe distortion due to the OPAMP saturation near VDD and 
VSS.  Different nonlinearities can be added to the finite amplifier with diodes and resistors to 
limit the gain K to a value that is less than 3 as the output amplitude of the finite gain 
amplifier approaches VDD or VSS.   By judiciously managing the finite gain by intentionally 
introducing nonlinearity in the finite gain amplifier, the hard saturation near VDD and VSS 
can be eliminated and distortion in the output of the Wein bridge oscillator can be reduced. 


















Figure 2-11 Soft nonlinearities in the amplifier 
However, some nonlinearity that may be introduced to reduce distortion can also 
create additional stationary operating modes. If the resistors, diodes and/or transistors 
connected in a way which makes the transfer characteristics of the amplifier nonlinear such 





















Figure 2-12 Wein Bridge Oscillator with one static Trojan state 
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 The modified circuit including all component values is shown in Figure 2-12. This 
circuit serves as the fourth benchmark circuit.  The OPAMP was still assumed to be ideal.  
Simulation results for this circuit are shown in Figure 2-13.   In the first simulation, the initial 
conditions on the capacitors C1 and C2 were set at 0 V and 0 V respectively.  In the second 
simulation the initial conditions were set at 2.5 V and 2.5 V respectively.  It can be observed 
from Figure 2-13 (a) that when the initial conditions on C2 and C1 are low, the circuit will 
not oscillate and VOUT will stay at a stable constant voltage.  However, when the initial 
conditions added at the two capacitors are higher, the circuit will start to oscillate, as shown 
in Figure 2-13(b).  In this example, the oscillator has two operating modes, of which one is a 
stable static mode while the other is a dynamic oscillating mode.   If the initial condition 
range to have the circuit converge to the static mode of operation is very small, it will be 
difficult to detect this mode even with many transient simulations. Furthermore, if the circuit 
with this static mode is used to generate periodic waves for other circuits, while some 
environment condition changes which accidentally trigger this static mode, the whole 
functional circuit may fail to work. So, for the oscillator, one kind of Hardware Trojans is 
that the oscillator has multiple operating modes and one of them is a static mode which will 
totally stop the function of the circuit.  This Trojan has the basic properties of a PAAST 
Trojan.   
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Figure 2-13 Two states of the oscillator with amplifier in Figure 2-12 at different initial 
conditions; (a) initial conditions on C1 and C2 is 0V and 0V; (b) initial conditions on C1 and 
C2 is 2.5V and 2.5V. 
Another type of dynamic analog Hardware Trojans in an oscillator is one that has 
more than one oscillating mode and all modes have different oscillating frequencies or 
different oscillating amplitudes. If the resistors, diodes, or transistors are connected in such a 
way that creates transfer characteristics of the finite gain amplifier with the nonlinear 
characteristics shown in Figure 2-14, two different stationary oscillating modes of the 
oscillator will be created.  A schematic of an implementation of the Wein bridge oscillator 
that includes this nonlinearity is shown in Figure 2-15. Simulation results for this circuit for 
two different set of initial conditions are shown in Figure 2-16.  The OPAMPs were assumed 
to be ideal in these simulations.  Both simulation results represent stationary modes of 
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oscillation.  In the first simulation the initial conditions on the capacitors C1 and C2 were set 
at 0.1 V and 0.1 V respectively.  In the second simulation the initial conditions were set at 2.5 
V and 2.5 V respectively.    
In the first simulation the frequency of oscillation was around 80 KHz and amplitude 
(peak value) was 0.4V. In the second simulation which corresponded to larger initial 
conditions on the two capacitors, the frequency was same around 80 KHz and the amplitude 
was 2.5V.  Note that the two oscillation frequencies are similar but the amplitudes are 
significantly different.  Though not shown here, the spectral characteristics of the two 
waveforms are also quite different.  The circuit of Figure 2-15 serves as the fifth benchmark 






























Figure 2-15 Wein Bridge Oscillator with one dynamic Trojan state 
Though not a popular method for designing the Wein bridge oscillator, the 
nonlinearity could also be added to resistors R1 and R2 or the capacitors C1 and C2.  If the 
nonlinearity is added at the RC part of the circuit while the amplifier has a constant gain, 
multiple stationary oscillating modes can also be observed under different initial conditions.  
In contrast to the nonlinearities in the finite gain amplifier part of the circuit which caused 
significant shifts in magnitude but only small changes in frequency, nonlinearities in the RC 
part cause significant changes in both amplitude and frequency.  
Much like the challenges of detecting the presence of Trojan static operating modes, 
the initial condition domain of attraction for Trojan dynamic operating modes of operation 
can be very narrow making it difficult to observe the presence of a Trojan that creates an 
undesired dynamic mode of operation by changing the initial conditions in a transient 
simulation.   Though the circuits with multiple dynamic modes of operation discussed in this 
section had only two energy storage elements, resulting in a two-dimensional initial 
condition domain, nonlinear circuits with more than two energy storage elements can also 
harbor dynamic PAAST Trojans.   A circuit with ‘n’ energy storage elements would require 
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‘n’ initial conditions to completely manage a transient simulation and considering all possible 
initial conditions in a transient simulation would require exploring an n-dimensional initial 
condition domain.  A well-disguised PAAST Trojan whereby the Trojan mode of operation 
had a domain of attraction that is small in an n-dimensional initial condition domain could be 





Figure 2-16 Two oscillating states of the Wein Bridge oscillator; (a)initial conditions on 
C1,C2 are 0.1V;(b) initial condtions on C1, C2 are 2.5V 
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2.2.2.2 Analog hardware Trojans in Sallen and Key structure based filter circuit 
Many filter circuits can harbor dynamic PAAST Trojans.  In this section, two types of 
PAAST Trojans that can be embedded in Sallen and Key filter circuits [35] will be discussed.  
Emphasis will be restricted to a single second-order Sallen and Key structure though results 
could be readily extended to many other structures of varying orders.   Since emphasis will 
be restricted to a single second-order structure, the results presented in this section are quite 
similar to those associated with the Wein bridge oscillator circuit.   
A popular Sallen-Key bandpass filter structure is shown in Figure 2-17(a). If the 
resistors are equal and the capacitors are equal, that is, R1=R2=R3=R and C1=C2=C, then the 
transfer function of this filter T(s), is given by Equation (2-3). 










                                                         (2-3) 
where K is the gain of the finite gain amplifier.  The finite gain amplifier is typically created 
using an OPAMP and two resistors.  
  As shown in the Equation (2-3), when K is smaller than 4, the poles are in the left 
half-plane, which makes the circuit stable. However, if K is larger than 4, there are poles in 
the right half-plane and the filter will not perform as a stable filter.  As in the Wein-bridge 
oscillator example, a nonlinearity can be added to the finite gain amplifier. If the transfer 
characteristics of the finite gain have the nonlinearity shown (exaggerated) in Figure 2-17(b), 
while the RC part of the filter circuit is ideal, two operating modes of the filter will occur for 
one time-domain input signal.  This circuit will serve as the sixth benchmark circuit. 
Simulation results for sinusoidal input with p-p amplitude of 0.5V and frequency of 5K Hz 
for initial conditions of on C1 and C2 of 0 V and 0 V respectively are shown in  Figure 2-18 
(a).  Simulation results with initial conditions on C1 and C2 of 2.5 V and 2.5V respectively 
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are shown in  Figure 2-18 (b). Two substantially different output signals can be observed at 
the VOUT for different initial conditions.  As expected, the output signals are both of the 
same frequency as the input signal but both the wave shape and the amplitudes of the outputs 
are substantially different.  
A similar observation has been reported in other papers [36]-[39] where the 
phenomenon was referred to as the Jump Resonance of the filter.  In the context of analog 
filters, the  effects of jump resonance are often undesired and unanticipated and associated 
with modest nonlinearities that naturally occur in the analog circuit itself [39] though some 
authors have intentionally taken advantage of the jump resonance phenomena to build very 
sensitive detection circuits.   Filters with jump resonance can have an abrupt voltage jump at 
the output node with small changes in the input signal’s frequency and no change in the 
amplitude of the input signal.   In such cases, instead of changing the mode of operation by 
changing the initial conditions, the mode of operation is changed can be changed by altering 
the input signal.  Actually, jump resonance in a filter can be viewed as a hysteresis window 
in the frequency domain transfer characteristics obtained when the input sinusoidal signal’s 














Figure 2-17 Sallen key bandpass filter and its nonlinearities in the amplifier 
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Figure 2-18  Two states of the filter with same input signal at different initial condtions 
Thus, the multiple dynamic outputs of the filter can be viewed as the outputs 
associated with a PAAST   Trojan.  As with other PAAST Trojans, the range of amplitudes 
and frequencies over which jump resonance can occur can be very narrow making it difficult 
to    detect the existence of this Trojan in a filter. 
2.2.2.3 Analog hardware Trojans in Sallen-Key based oscillator circuit 
It has been shown in the previous section that for modest nonlinearities in the finite 
gain amplifier, the Sallen and Key filter circuit can harbor a PAAST Trojan with a jump 
resonance payload.  Specifically, for a given sinusoidal input signal with fixed frequency and 
fixed peak-to-peak amplitude, the circuit can have two stationary dynamic modes of 
operation.  In the desired mode of operation, the output will be a sinusoidal signal with 
amplitude and phase scaled as predicted from the linear transfer function of the filter.  In the 










Figure 2-19 Oscillator based upon Sallen-Key structure with K=4 
A Sallen-Key type oscillator can also be formed by adjusting the gain of the finite 
gain amplifier for the circuit of in Figure 2-17 to 4 and grounding the input as shown in 
Figure 2-19.  The characteristic equation for this circuit under the assumption of linear 
operation for R1=R2=R3=R and C1=C2=C  is given by Equation (2-4)  






                                                       (2-4) 
Sinusoidal oscillation is achieved by placing the poles on the imaginary axis which 
will occur when K=4 ideally.  In practice, a slight nonlinearity is introduced into the 
amplifier to control both amplitude and distortion of the oscillator output with a gain that is 
slightly larger than 4 for small-amplitude output signals and slightly less than 4 for large 
amplitude output signals.  However, if an additional slightly nonlinearity region exists in the 









Figure 2-20 Nonlinearity in the gain of K amplifier 
A specific nonlinearity of the finite gain amplifier that can be used in the Sallen and 
Key oscillator is shown exaggerated in Figure 2-20 .  This can be considered as the seventh 
benchmark circuit.  This oscillator was designed for generating a periodical sinusoidal signal 
with a frequency of around 560 KHz.  
Simulation results for this circuit are shown in Figure 2-21 for two different initial 
conditions on the capacitors C1 and C2.  In this simulation, the initial conditions on C1 and 
C2 were set at 0.1 V for the first simulation and at 2.5V for the second simulation.  
Simulation results showing the desired oscillation mode corresponding to the first initial 
condition is in Figure 2-21(a), while the Trojan oscillating mode corresponding to the second 
initial condition is shown in Figure 2-21(b).  In the desired mode of oscillation, the output is 
nearly sinusoidal with an oscillation frequency of approximately 560 KHz signal and with 
amplitude of approximately 2V p-p.  The Trojan mode of operation provides a highly 
distorted signal with amplitude in excess of 4V p-p.  The frequencies of oscillation for the 





Figure 2-21 Stationary oscillating States of circuits with K in Figure 2-20 
In the design of this circuit, the nonlinearities in the amplifier can be set so that the 
Trojan mode exists only over a small range of initial conditions, or over a large range of 
initial conditions.  Regardless, this is also a PAAST Trojan.   
Though the nonlinearity was introduced in the finite gain amplifier in this circuit, the 
RC part of the circuit can also have a signal magnitude dependent nonlinearity.  As for the 
Wein bridge oscillator, by introducing the nonlinearity in the finite gain amplifier, both 
modes of operation resulted in about the same frequency of oscillation but significantly 
different magnitudes.  Introducing the nonlinearity into the RC part of this circuit in such a 
way that two stationary modes of operation are obtained will cause a shift in frequency 
between the desired and Trojan modes of operation. 
Though the examples presented here have focused on a single stationary dynamic 
Trojan mode where the characteristics of the Trojan mode are significantly different than 
those of the desired mode of operation, oscillators with multiple dynamic Trojan modes of 
operation have been observed where the frequency and amplitude are different in each Trojan 
45 
mode.  Other oscillator circuits have been observed that exhibit an undesired stable static 
mode of operation. Though significant nonlinearities have been intentionally introduced in 
the dynamic benchmark circuits to introduce PAAST Trojans, even modest nonlinearities 
typical of those that more naturally occur can also create PAAST Trojans.    Such Trojans 
can be introduced without making any changes in the circuit architecture and thus will escape 
essentially all proposed methods for detecting a hardware Trojan.  
2.2.3 Analog Hardware Trojans in injection locked circuits 
  Generation of clock signals in integrated circuits that have a large number of digital 
gates is becoming an increasingly challenging problem since systematic and random path 
delays often introduce unacceptably large clock skew. Traditional clock distribution methods 
are based upon global H-Tree and local H-Tree networks which ideally can reduce clock 
skew to acceptable levels by balancing the length and parasitics of delay path with careful 
layout techniques. However, in emerging processes, higher clock rates, larger die sizes, wider 
busses, and increasing numbers of interconnect layers are making it increasingly difficult to 
meet skew requirements with traditional clock distribution methods. In recent years, there has 
been considerable interest in using synchronous distributed clock oscillators to locally 
generate clock signals. This approach offers potential for reducing the clock skew inherent 
with H-tree clock routing as well as attractive phase noise properties [40]-[42]. Invariably 
these clock-generation oscillators incorporate some level of injection locking and phase 
alignment to meet clock skew requirements. But these injection-locked clock generation 
networks can also harbor hardware Trojans and the Trojans that can be introduced in 
injection-locked clock generators are the focus of this section. Similar PAAST Trojans which 
have undesired states or equilibrium points in a static circuit or undesired modes of operation 
in a nonlinear dynamic circuit, injection locked clock generation circuits can also have extra 
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undesired mode of operation. In this section, three injection locked oscillators for clock 
generation purposes with PAAST Trojans are introduced as another three benchmark circuits.  
The circuits are designed so that they normally operate as desired but when triggered, 
they switch to the Trojan mode of operation. The first injection locked oscillator which can 
be the eighth benchmark circuit is comprised of two injection locked 3-stage ring oscillators 
with complimentary outputs. During normal operation, injection locking is used to lock both 
to the same frequency. A stationary Trojan mode of operation, when triggered, causes both to 
operate at the same frequency but with in-phase outputs instead of complimentary outputs. 
When in the Trojan mode, the amplitude and frequency are also different from what is 
obtained in the desired mode. The ninth benchmark circuit is an injection-locked frequency 
divider [43]. It is comprised of two three-stage ring oscillators where one oscillates at a 
nominal frequency that is approximately twice that of the other. A flip-flop is used to divide 
the higher frequency by a factor of 2 to obtain a subharmonic output. The lower frequency 
oscillator output is injection-locked to the higher frequency oscillator thereby forcing the low 
frequency oscillator output to be at exactly half of the frequency of the higher frequency 
oscillator. In the desired mode of operation, the two lower-frequency outputs are in-phase. A 
Trojan mode of operation, when triggered, causes the two outputs to be 180° out of phase. 
The two outputs are of the same frequency and the same output amplitude as the desired 
signals. The tenth benchmark circuit is of a widely used quadrature oscillator where two 
voltage-controlled LC oscillators are injection-locked to provide quadrature outputs [44]-
[45]. Though the Quadrature Voltage Controlled Oscillator (QVCO) is known to have two 
modes of operation, one with a 90º phase lead and one with a 90º phase lag, a Trojan mode 
can be inserted into the QVCO to introduce a third mode of operation. In the Trojan mode, 
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the quadrature outputs disappear. There is also a shift in frequency in the Trojan mode from 
the two quadrature modes of operation. All the three circuits can be triggered to the Trojan 
mode by setting proper initial conditions and all three circuits will be classified as benchmark 
circuits. Different initial conditions will cause the circuits to converge to different modes of 
operation if multiple stationary operating modes exist. Even during the design and simulation 
phases, the circuits may only be observed to operate at the desired mode, but they transition 
to the Trojan state when the operating conditions change to values that are in the domain of 
attraction of the Trojan state or mode. 
2.2.3.1 Analog Trojan in three stage coupled ring oscillator 
A coupled injection-locked three stage ring oscillator [46] is shown in Figure 2-22. 
Depending upon how the devices are sized, several different dynamic modes of operation 
have been reported. For some device sizing, this circuit exhibits two stable equilibrium points 
and one oscillatory mode. For other device sizing, it exhibits two distinct oscillatory modes. 









Figure 2-22 Three stage coupled ring oscillator 
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One implementation of the three-stage coupled ring oscillator circuit is shown in 
Figure 2-22. The inverters are all basic two-transistor CMOS circuits.   An implementation of 
this circuit was made and simulated in a 0.5 µm ON CMOS process operating with  supply 
voltages of VDD=2.5V and VSS=-2.5V.   Minimum-dimension lengths were used for all 
devices.  The n-channel devices in the I2 inverters were of minimum width.  The p-channel 
devices in the I2 inverters had a width of 3 times that of the n-channel devices.  The inverters 
denoted with 1I  were sized  6 times larger (i.e. the widths were increased by a factor of 6)  
than the inverters denoted with 2I . Transient simulation results for two different sets of initial 
conditions are shown in Figure 2-23. The initial conditions were set so that both modes of 
operation can be observed in the transient simulations.  
The simulation results show that this circuit has two stationary oscillating modes 
which can be triggered by appropriately setting the initial conditions on the capacitors. In 
Mode 1, V1 and V2 are out of phase, whereas in Mode 2, V1 and V2 are in-phase.  The two 
modes of oscillation have different oscillating frequencies and different peak-to-peak 
amplitudes. In Mode 1, the circuit’s oscillating frequency is about 0.86GHz and peak-to-peak 
amplitude is 4V. However, in Mode 2, the circuit’s oscillating frequency is about 0.4GHz 
with a peak to peak amplitude of 4.8V.  If the oscillator is designed to obtain two 180o  out of 





Figure 2-23 Simulation results for injection=locked ring oscillator of Figure 2-22 showing 
two modes of operation 
2.2.3.2 Analog Trojan in injection locked frequency divider 
Injection locking can be used to lock two oscillator circuits at the same frequency or 
lock one oscillator circuit to another oscillator’s sub harmonic frequency. For systems with a 
frequency divider, injection locking in the circuits can have extra phase modes. The 
undesired phase relationship between signals can serve as Trojans in the circuit. The clock 
generator in Figure 2-24 can be used to generate these two signals which are operating at 






Figure 2-24 The configuration of frequency divider with extra mode existing; (a) Frequency 














Figure 2-25 Two modes in the circuit of Figure 2-24  
In Figure 2-24 (a), there are two separate ring oscillator circuits. The signal generated 
by ring oscillator 1 has one oscillating frequency designated as ‘Fsync’, while the signal 
generated after the D-flip flop oscillates at a frequency designated as ‘Fsync/2’. The ring 
oscillator 2 generates signal oscillating around ‘Fsync/2’. In Figure 2-24(b), three transistors 
are used to sub harmonic injection lock these two ring oscillators. By doing injection locking, 
the oscillating frequency of ring oscillator 2 will be exactly half of the oscillating frequency 
of ring oscillator 1 and will be exactly the same as signal ‘Fref’. However, there are two 
possible phase relationships between the signals at node ‘Fos’ and the signal ‘Fref’ from the 
DFF. 
The injection locking is implemented directionally with the three transistors from the 
top ring oscillator to the bottom ring oscillator, thus ring oscillator 2 is locked to the sub 






































































harmonic frequency of the top oscillator. The frequency of the signal at ‘Fos’ will be exactly 
half of the oscillating frequency of ring oscillator 1.  The signal at node ‘Fos’ will have the 
same oscillating frequency as the signal generated at DFF. However, it can be in phase or out 
of phase with the signal at node ‘Fos’ and the signal at ‘Frev’ with the phase determined by 
the initial conditions in both the upper and lower circuit. Simulation results for the injection 
locked oscillators designed in 0.5u ON process are shown in Figure 2-25. In the simulations, 
initial conditions were changed to excite the two different stationary modes of operation. In 
Figure 2-25 (a), the signal at ‘Fref’ and ‘Fos’ are out of phase, while in Figure 2-25 (b), the 
signal ‘Fref’ and ‘Fos’ are in phase.  By implementing sub-harmonic injection locking, two 
signals can be locked to the same frequency but there may be one or more undesired phase 
relationships. 
2.2.3.3 Analog Trojan in quadrature oscillators 
The circuit shown in Figure 2-26 is a traditional quadrature LC oscillator. It is often 
used to generate 90° phase difference signals. The circuit has been designed with the device 
sizes given in Table 2-1 in an ON process with  a supply voltage as 5V. It has been designed 
so that the phase difference between signals at nodes labeled Q1 and Q4 is 90° difference, 
which is the same as the phase difference between Q3 andQ2. However, because of the 
symmetrical characteristics, depending on the initial conditions, Q1 may be 90° leading Q4 
or lagging Q4, and Q3 may be 90° leading Q2 or lagging Q2. These are the two modes of 
operation in this circuit which are well known. Simulation results showing the two modes of 
operation are shown in Figure 2-27. Depending on the initial conditions, the sequence of the 
four signals can be Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 or Q1, Q4, Q3, Q2. If the phase sequence is critical in the 




Figure 2-26 The conventional quadrature VCO 
Table 2-1 size configuration of circuit in Figure 2-26 
M1,M3 4(6u/1.2u) L 1nH 
M2,M4 5(6u/1.2u) C 120pF 




















Figure 2-28 One signal path of the QVCO and its oscillating mode 
The existence of the two modes of operation for this circuit has been reported in 
many papers. However, there is a third  mode that can exist in this circuit as well with the 
same size configurations listed in Table 2-1 and this third mode has not been reported.   This 
third mode is due to the presence of parasitic capacitors in the circuit. In Figure 2-28, one 
path of the quadrature oscillator that includes one inductor, the transistor in the middle, and 
the current source transistor is shown along with the parasitic capacitors.  In this example, the 
biasing on the two gates has been set at 5V.  This circuit can oscillate with proper initial 
conditions because of the parasitic capacitors. Simulation results of this circuit are shown in 
Figure 2-28. Since the parasitic capacitors are very small, the oscillating period is only 
37.6ps. 
The quadrature oscillator includes four paths of circuits shown in Figure 2-28. With 
the sizes in Table 2-1, and with the proper initial conditions, a third oscillating mode can be 
triggered and it is due to the parasitic capacitors. Simulation results for the quadrature 
oscillator showing the third mode of operation are shown in Figure 2-29. The oscillating 
frequency is hugely different from the two well-known modes of operation. The frequency of 
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the two known modes is about 350MHz whereas and the frequency of operation for the third 
mode is 12.5GHz.  And, since the third mode of operation is dependent upon parasitic 
capacitances, the frequency of operation can be manipulated by an unscrupulous designer by 
layouts that may change the size of the parasitic capacitances.   
 
Figure 2-29  The third mode in the QVCO with sizes in Table 2-1 
If this circuit is designed and used, the extra two modes (the undesired phase or the 
undesired high frequency of oscillation) are PAAST Trojans and disastrous results can 
happen because of the phase and frequency differences.    
Once vulnerability to the presence of the third mode of operation is recognized, 
methods can be established to eliminate it.   Though not the focus of this research, it can be 
shown that if the loop gain of the positive feedback loop is large enough, the third mode can 
be eliminated. 
2.3 Comparison with a kind of PAAST Trojans in digital circuits 
As shown in the examples, the Trojans in analog circuit can be in amplitude voltage 
domain, frequency domain, or phase domain. If the Trojan is triggered, important data can 
leak or the system may be denial of service because of the undesired frequency, phase or 
amplitude. Especially in military, medical treatment area, the results brought by these 
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Trojans can be catastrophic. These analog hardware Trojans served by extra operating points 
or modes can easily be inserted into many commonly used circuits. The existence of this type 
of Trojan requires no additional circuitry, no increase in power, no increase in area, no 
changes in architecture, and that leave no signatures in either power or timing busses prior to 
triggering. The PAAST characteristics make the Trojan hard to detect. 
A kind of hardware Trojan which can be embedded in arbitrary finite state machine is 
discussed in [47] and these kinds of Trojans are also with PAAST characteristics.  
The Trojan described in [47] is the redundant state or ‘don’t care states’ in the state 
machine. A state machine as an example is shown in Figure 2-30. It has three normal 
working states ‘00’ ‘01’ ‘10’, and one redundant state ‘11’.  The state machine can have 
transitions from one of these three states to another working state. Normally, there is zero 
probability for transitions happening from any of the three working state to the redundant 
state. However, if there is some trigger mechanism added, it can trigger the state machine to 
work at this redundant state or make the redundant state occur during the normal transition 
time.  Since the redundant state inherently exist in the state machine, a Trojan served by this 
redundant state will also have no power, architecture, area overhead or with any signature 
variation. Thus, as Trojans, the redundant state in state machine has the same property as the 
extra equilibrium state/mode in analog circuit.   
However, different to the PAAST Trojans served by extra operating points or modes 
in analog circuit of which the existence is not known, the existence of the redundant state in 
the state machine is already known by the designer. It only needs to detect whether the circuit 
has any potential trigger mechanism inserted into the circuit to make the transition to the 
redundant state happen. But for the Trojan in analog circuit, it is not only necessary to detect 
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the trigger mechanism but also need to detect the presence of the extra equilibrium states. 
Comparing to the PAAST Trojan in digital circuits, the analog PAAST Trojan is even more 






Figure 2-30 State machine with 3 normal states and 1 redundant state 
2.4 Temperature signatures in analog static circuit 
2.4.1 Three temperature signatures observed in Inverse Widlar circuit 
Three different implementations of the inverse wilder circuit are shown in Figure 
2-31  designed in a 0.5u ON CMOS process, are characterized by the device sizes (W and L 
values along with multiplier factor) shown in Table 2-2. These three implementations are 
designated as Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 circuits, showing three different temperature 
signatures of multiple equilibriums in this circuit. The inverse Widlar circuit exclusive of a 
start-up circuit in Figure 2-31 can be used as a bias voltage generator, a bias current 







Figure 2-31 Inverse Widlar circuit 
Table 2-2 Three types of example circuits’ sizes 
Sizes and types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
M1(W/L)*M (1.5u/3u)*1 (1.5u/3u)*1 (1.5u/3u)*1 
M2(W/L)*M (4.8u/600n)*1 (1.5u/900n) (1.8u/600n)*10 
M3(W/L)*M (2.4u/600n)*1 (2.4u/600n)*1 (1.5u/600n)*1 
M4(W/L)*M (3u/3u)*5 (3u/3u)*5 (3u/3u)*5 
M5(W/L)*M (3u/3u)*5 (3u/3u)*5 (3u/3u)*5 
2.4.1.1 Type 1 signature-one operating point in temperature domain 
Type1 signature: Simulation results for the Type 1 implementation are shown Figure 
2-32. With this implementation, no hysteresis window is observed and the circuit has a 
unique solution at each temperature.  This operation has been confirmed by doing a break-
loop homotopy analysis like that described in [48] at a large number of individual 
temperature values.  If this unique solution signature is maintained over process and supply 
voltage variations, a start-up circuit is not needed for this implementation. 
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Figure 2-32 Type 1 signature: single operating point in each temperature 
2.4.1.2 Type 2 signature-Hysteresis window in the temperature domain 
 Type2 signature: Simulation results for the Type 2 circuit showed a hysteresis 





C.  The actual temperature characteristics which have a continuous 
transition between a single operating point and multiple equilibrium points are shown in 
Figure 2-33. This is designated as a Type 2 signature. This implementation has three 
equilibrium points for 52
o
C < T < 183
o
C.  If the intended operation of this circuit is as a 
voltage reference, current reference, or temperature sensor, a start-up circuit is needed to 
eliminate the undesired stable equilibrium point.   
   Both the location and the width of the hysteresis window can be changed by 
adjusting the sizes of some transistors.  Thus, instead of using a start-up circuit to eliminate 
the undesired equilibrium point the circuit can be used as a temperature trigger circuit [49] by 
programming one edge of the hysteresis window of circuits with a Type 2 signature so that it 
occurs at the desired trigger temperature. A detailed design of temperature trigger circuit is 
discussed in the following section. 
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Figure 2-33 Type 2 signature - continuous transition between single and multiple operating 
points 
2.4.1.3 Type 3 signature- isolation region in the temperature domain 
 Type3 signature: Simulation results for the Type 3 circuit are shown in Figure 2-34. 
This signature is characterized by a part of the temperature characteristics that cannot be 
reached by a continuous perturbation from some other parts of the temperature 
characteristics. The locus of points that form a closed curve will be termed an isolation 
region.  A Type 3 signature is characterized by an isolation region. This Type 3 circuit has 
three equilibrium points for 3
o
C < T < 118
o
C.  If designed to operate at a single equilibrium 
point, a start-up circuit would also be required to eliminate the isolation region.  The 
presence of multiple equilibrium points when an isolation region exists cannot be easily 
detected with a bi-directional temperature sweep (discussed in Chapter 3).  
 The location and size of the isolation region can also be controlled with judicious 
device sizing.  With the device sizes shown in Table 2-3, the very narrow isolation region 
shown in Figure 2-35 is obtained.  Circuits with narrow isolation regions may also be very 
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difficult to verify with standard homotopy methods since the multiple equilibrium points 
would not be present if the simulation temperatures were outside of the narrow range 
corresponding to the isolation region.  
 
Figure 2-34 Type 3- an isolated region in a temperature range 
Table 2-3 sizes of example circuit with very narrow isolated region 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 




Figure 2-35 Operating points with a narrow isolated region in a temperature range 
Though the three identified signatures were presented as examples with the inverse 
Widlar structure of Figure 2-31, it can be shown that these signatures can also exist in other 
widely used circuits. 
2.4.2 Temperature trigger design based on Schmitt trigger circuit 
As discussed in previous sections, multiple equilibrium points are sensitive to 
temperature variations. In most condition, the extra operating point in static analog circuit is 
undesired and termed as Trojans. However, designers may also explore the characteristics of 
circuits with multiple equilibriums for some specific and practical use. In this section, a 
temperature trigger circuit is designed by exploring a type 2 temperature signature in a 
Schmitt trigger circuit. 
In many high-performance applications, local power densities are increasing with 
decreasing feature sizes in newer CMOS process. The increasing power densities often cause 
a localized increase in temperature or an increase in temperature across the die. High 
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temperatures invariably influence the performance of a circuit, cause the circuit to fail, and/or 
degrade the lifetime of IC.  To mitigate these concerns, localized on-chip thermal monitoring 
circuits have become an integral part of the power/thermal management of the integrated 
circuit.  In most power management approaches, the system is protected [50] by frequency 
throttling, task reassignment, or thermal shutdown whenever the temperature exceeds a 
predetermined trigger temperature.  
 Most of the existing temperature sensor or thermal monitoring circuits are based on 
the temperature dependence of some characteristics of the devices that are available in a 
given process. Two properties of devices available in CMOS processes are often discussed in 
the literature for building on-chip temperature sensors. One is the thermal voltage and 
another is the threshold voltage.  References [51][52] present temperature sensor circuits that 
use the temperature dependence of the threshold voltage and the thermal voltage respectively 
to build temperature sensors.  
 
Figure 2-36 The standard temperature monitoring (temperature to digital) system 
 A standard temperature monitoring system that provides a digital representation of 
the temperature is shown in Figure 2-36 [53].  The three core parts of the system are the 









management system, the output code is typically read periodically from the A/D module and 
compared with the predetermined trigger temperature.  Based upon this comparison, action is 
initiated if necessary to guarantee the temperature remains below the critical temperature. 
Due to delays associated with temperature measurement, corrective action, and thermal 
propagation, hysteresis in the temperature is often observed [54].  
Many temperature sensor and reference generator circuits use positive feedback loops 
to reduce output sensitivity to the power supply voltage and these circuits are vulnerable to 
the multiple equilibrium point problem.  Start-up circuits are invariably used to keep these 
circuits operating at the desired equilibrium point [48]. Start-up circuits require a modest 
increase in area and it may be difficult to verify that they are effective over local and global 
PVT variations. 
A low power and ultra-small temperature trigger circuit is introduced in section based 
on the multiple equilibrium in the circuit. It is based upon a Schmitt trigger structure with 
only four transistors required to generate a programmable hysteresis window in the 
temperature domain.  The Schmitt trigger circuit is generally viewed as a circuit that exhibits 
a hysteresis window in the input voltage / output voltage plane obtained by sweeping the 
input voltage forward and backward.  More precisely, it is characterized by a region of input 
voltages that have more than one output voltage.  The hysteresis window is attributable to the 
presence of a positive feedback loop. 
 In contrast to a conventional Schmitt trigger circuits where the input variable is a 
voltage, in a temperature trigger circuit the input variable is temperature and the output 
variable is a Boolean variable.   But like the conventional Schmitt trigger circuits, a 
temperature trigger circuit with hysteresis is characterized by a region of input temperatures 
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that have more than one output voltage.  With appropriate simulators, the hysteresis can be 
exhibited by sweeping the input temperature forward and backwards. The temperature trigger 
circuit introduced here will exhibit hysteresis when the input temperature is swept forward 
and backwards using the SPECTRE simulator. For power management, hysteresis window in 
temperature domain will help to avoid frequently turning off or turning on of responded 
circuits. 
2.4.2.1 Threshold voltage based temperature trigger with hysteresis 
A Schmitt trigger circuit is shown in Figure 2-37 [55]. With the parameters Kp and β 
defined by the expressions 
                               
p1 p1
p2 p2
(W / L )
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It was shown that the boundaries of the hysteresis region in the VOUT: VIN plane are 
given by the expressions   
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Figure 2-37 Schmitt trigger circuit and return map 
The hysteresis region at a fixed temperature is apparent in the bi-directional input 
sweep shown in Figure 2-37 (b).   From Equation (2-6) and (2-7), it is apparent that both the 
location and the width of the hysteresis region are dependent upon both design parameters 
and the threshold voltage. 
The threshold voltage is temperature dependent.  In the BSIM model, this temperature 
dependence is modeled by the expression 
                                  (2-8) 
Neglecting the effects of Vbseff, it follows Equation (2-11) that the threshold voltage is 
linearly dependent on temperature and can be expressed as   
                                                0thV k T VTH                                                   (2-9) 
Where the parameter k is the slope and VTH0 is the 0 K axis intercept.  A typical 
value of k for n-channel MOSFETs is around -1.32mV/oC.  It thus follows that VT+ and VT- 
in (2-6) and (2-7) are both approximately linearly dependent on temperature. Thus, for an 
appropriate fixed input voltage VIN and appropriate device sizes, VT+ and VT- will be equal to 
VIN at different temperatures.  It follows that this circuit can be designed to have a hysteresis 
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window in the temperature domain.   If a comparator is connected to the output of this 
Schmitt trigger circuit, the relationship between the comparator output and the input 
temperature will be a two-level output with hysteresis.  The temperature trigger circuit is 
shown in Figure 2-38 (a).  The fixed input to the Schmitt trigger block, denoted as the 
“Thermal Hysteresis Block”, is the dc voltage VBB.  The comparator is implemented with a 
basic CMOS inverter.  The transfer characteristics of the temperature trigger circuit showing 





















TP1   W=2.4u,L=1.6u,m=1
TP2   W=2.4u,L=1.6u,m=1
TP     W=1.4u*,L=2.5u,m=1
TN1    W=2.4u,L=1.6u,m=4
 
Figure 2-38 Temperature trigger (a) proposed circuit (b) output voltage vs temperature 
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For a fixed input voltage, if we neglect the temperature dependency of VTP, it 
follows from (2-6) and (2-7) that VT+ and VT- also have linear relationships with temperature 
with identical slopes but with different offsets that can be expressed as   
                                                TV a T m                                                          (2-10) 
                                              TV a T n                                                            (2-11) 
Where the parameters α, m, and n can be obtained from (2-6) and (2-7).  These linear 












Figure 2-39 Hysteresis window in temperature domain 
When the input voltage is fixed at VBB, it will intersect with the VT+ and VT- lines at 
the two distinct temperatures T+ and T-. These two temperatures form the boundaries of a 
hysteresis window for VOUT in the temperature domain as shown in Figure 2-39(b). For 
different input voltages, the two intersections with the VT+ and VT- lines occur at different 
temperatures but the center of the hysteresis region moves almost linearly with the input 
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voltage. But the difference between T+ and T- for different values of VBB are constant when 
the lines for VT- and VT+ are parallel.  In this way, the location of the hysteresis window can 
be varied by changing the input voltage while keeping the width of the hysteresis window 
fixed as shown in Figure 2-40. 
The difference between VT+ and VT- , designated as VH, is given in Equation (2-12). 
                                                                                                (2-12) 
It follows that the width of the hysteresis window in the temperature domain is given 
by 
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Though the hysteresis window width is fixed for a given value of VH, the width can be 



























The equal slope of the VT+ and VT- lines is attributable to the assumption that the 
temperature dependence of VTp could be neglected. If the temperature dependence of VTp is 
included, the locus of VT+ and VT- will still be nearly linear but the slopes will be different as 
depicted in Figure 2-41. This will cause a modest change in the width of the hysteresis 
window in the temperature domain if the input voltage is changed to move the hysteresis 
window along the temperature axis and introduce a small nonlinearity in the relationship 




Figure 2-41 VT+ and VT- with diffident temperature coefficients 
The effects of including the temperature dependence of the threshold voltage of the p-
channel devices on the movement of the hysteresis window with the input voltage is shown 
with a SPECTRE simulation of one implementation of this circuit in Figure 2-42.  It is 
apparent that in this design that the change in the width of the hysteresis window as it is 
moved along the temperature axis with changes in the input voltage is modest. Also, this 
small ‘∆location ’ variation can be compensated by the control circuit in Figure 2-43 (a) with 
temperature characteristics in Figure 2-43 (b). 
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Figure 2-42 Simulation results at different input voltage 
2.4.2.2 Programmable circuit 
The location of the hysteresis window can be made programmable by adjusting the 
input voltage VBB.  One simple circuit that can be used to adjust the input voltage is shown in 
Figure 2-43.  In this circuit, the switches which can be controlled by a digital MUX are made 
of single MOS transistors and the devices on the left and right sides of the circuit are sized to 
create a small voltage gradient in the voltages at the intermediate nodes of the resistor string.  
This hysteresis location circuit was combined with the temperature trigger of Figure 
2-38 to provide a programmable temperature trigger with a 2-bit window location control.   
This programmable temperature trigger circuit was designed in a 0.13µm CMOS process with 
poly silicon resistors used for the resistor string. The circuit was biased with a single 1.2V 
supply. Device sizes in this design are given in the circuit figure.  SPECTRE simulation 
results of the temperature trigger are shown in Figure 2-43 (c).  It can be seen from these 
simulation results that the hysteresis window is programmable over a reasonably large range 
and that the width of the hysteresis window does not change significantly with position.   
Finer resolution can be easily obtained with minimal area overhead if needed in a specific 
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application.  And, if tighter control of the width of the hysteresis window is needed, the width 
can be programmed by digitally adjusting βn, βp, or KP. In most power management 





































Figure 2-43 Input voltage control circuit and simulation results 
A very small programmable temperature trigger circuit with hysteresis suitable for 
power management applications has been introduced by exploring the type 2 temperature 
signature of multiple equilibriums in a Schmitt trigger circuit. Both the location and width of 
the hysteresis window can be digitally programmed.  When designed in a 0.13um process, 
the total power dissipation of the programmable temperature trigger is 72µW, and the total 




CHAPTER 3.    DETECTION METHOD OF PAAST TROJANS IN ANALOG 
CIRCUITS 
PAAST analog hardware Trojans can make the circuit have performance alteration, 
resulting to malfunction or information leakage. However, since the extra operating 
points/modes inserted in the circuit are because of the circuit structure and devices’ sizes 
configuration, there is no any physical characteristics variation compared to the Trojan free 
circuit, such as any power, area overhead, circuit architecture difference, signature variation 
in the power supply bus, or delay changes in the timing path, which makes it very difficult to 
detect. Almost all the existing Trojan detection methods [56]-[58], are normally based on the 
difference of these physical characteristics compared to the Trojan free circuit to detect the 
presence of Trojans. Because of the transparent characteristic of this type of Trojans, all these 
existing methods would fail to detect the presence of the Trojan served by the undesired 
operating points. Even the circuit is given with details of topology, it is still very hard to 
verify the circuit, specifically when the circuit is large and complex. However, since many 
analog circuits are designed with positive feedback loops, this type of Trojans is easily to be 
inserted to even very commonly used analog circuits.  
In this chapter, methods detecting PAAST hardware Trojans in analog static circuit 
and dynamic circuit will be introduced. 
3.1 Methods to detect PAAST hardware Trojans in static analog circuits 
3.1.1 State of art of method to detect multiple equilibrium points 
Identifying the presence of an undesired stable equilibrium point with a simulator is 
complicated by the fact that such points may exist only over a portion of the process, voltage, 
and temperature (PVT) domain. Correspondingly, verifying the effectiveness of start-up 
circuits is complicated by the same issues. The problem is more challenging because circuit 
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simulators only provide a single output at any point in the PVT domain even when multiple 
outputs exist irrespective of whether the designer is or is not aware of the presence of 
undesired stable equilibrium points in the circuit. But the biggest challenge is more 
fundamental in nature. The problem of finding all solutions of a set of nonlinear equations 
remains an open problem in the mathematics and computer science research communities 
and it remains unknown whether all stable equilibrium points in even some basic circuits are 
recognized by the designers. If an undesired stable equilibrium point remains undetected, a 
circuit is vulnerable to failure if it enters this undesired state. Thus, methods of identifying 
undesired stable equilibrium points, even if they cannot guarantee all operating points have 
been identified, are of use [24][59]-[64]. Homotopy methods are often used to identify 
multiple equilibrium points though in the general case even these methods will not 
necessarily find all equilibrium points. 
3.1.1.1 facts and anti-facts of simulators 
Circuit simulators are specifically designed to solve the set of linear and nonlinear 
equations that characterize the operation of a circuit and they do this very well. For this 
reason, it is highly desirable to use circuit simulators to address the multiple equilibrium 
point challenge. In simulators such as Spectre, homotopy methods are used to trace the DC 
solutions. However, in this application, they are structured to just find one solution and then 
stop. Since circuit simulators provide only a single solution for an output voltage or output 
current, simulation strategies need to be developed that may help identify the presence of 
multiple equilibrium points. In Cadence’s parametric analysis simulation method, it does not 
couple simulation results from one temperature step to the next in a temperature “sweep” so 
the simulation results obtained from stepping temperature are all independent from each got 
at different temperature. But it will be shown by example that the lack of coupling in 
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temperature “sweeps” may be beneficial in some situations for determining the presence of 
multiple equilibrium points since the coupling between simulation steps has been severed. 
The widely-used Wilson bias generator, without a start-up circuit, is shown in Figure 
3-1. The simulation is based on 0.5u ON process. The circuit has been designed so that the 





parametric analysis sweeping method in temperature domain for an implementation of this 
circuit was made in Spectre and the results, which show a single output for each temperature 
point, are shown in Figure 3-2 (a). These somewhat peculiar results may appear to raise 
questions about the simulation. Removing the interconnection points which are an artifact of 
the graphing routine used to display the output data, the actual simulation data shown in 
Figure 3-2(b) is obtained. As will be discussed in the following section, this simulation 
provides very useful information about the circuit and not only shows the presence of more 
than one stable equilibrium point at temperatures above 65
o
C; it also shows the presence of 
an unstable equilibrium point.  
 
Figure 3-1 Wilson circuit 
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Figure 3-2  Simulation results of parametric analysis of temperature 
However, the success demonstrated in the simulation shown Figure 3-2 for 
identifying the presence of more than one equilibrium point is not predictable. Consider a 
second example that has two Wilson bias generators in one circuit schematic as shown in 
Figure 3-3 (a) where all that the two circuits share in common is the ground node. The 
corresponding graphical representation of this circuit is a “hinged-graph”. The circuits are 
identical except for a start-up circuit which has been added to the circuit on the right. 
Simulation results of a temperature sweep are shown in Figure 3-3(b). The two outputs show 
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an identical dependence on temperature and do not show any evidence of the three 
equilibrium points that exist for the circuit on the left at temperatures above 65
o
C which were 
shown when the circuit was simulated by itself. Other combinations of circuits into a 
schematic with a hinged graph have also shown differences between the results obtained with 
a combined simulation and those obtained with individual simulations. Numerical coupling 
in the simulator affects the simulation results of circuits with multiple equilibrium points. 
 
Figure 3-3 The anti-facts of simulators when simulating two circuits 
Consider again the simulation results shown in Figure 3-2 (b). There are 
corresponding operating points for the other two intermediate node voltages in the circuit. 
Every point in the figure is one solution but it may not be the only one. From the simulation 
results, three trend lines or trend traces can be seen. So based on these results, different initial 
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voltages can be set on all internal nodes prior to doing the parametric analysis in temperature 
domain. The initial voltages will serve as a point of attraction for the solutions. Figure 3-4 
shows simulation results obtained by sweeping temperature with different node sets close to 
those determined from the simulation results of Figure 3-2(b). Simulation results for setting 
an initial condition on the VOUT node of 3.3V are shown in Figure 3-4(a). Figure 3-4(b) 
shows the results when the output node is set at 4.2V. Figure 3-4 (c) shows simulation results 
when the output node is set at 4.6V. The results are combined to obtain the transfer 
characteristics shown in Figure 3-4 (d). From Figure 3-4(d), it can be seen that the circuit has 
three equilibrium points when the temperature is larger than 65°C but a single operating 
point at temperatures below 65
o
C. Note that the results in Figure 3-2(b) obtained with a 
single sweep is consistent with the transfer characteristics shown in Figure 3-4(d) but from an 
interpretation of the results of Figure 3-2(b), the multiple equilibrium points were predicted. 
 
Figure 3-4 Simulation results with different initial condition voltage 
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3.1.1.2 Existing methods to detect Trojans in analog circuit with simulator 
In [48], intact loop and breaking loop method are discussed to detect the presence of 
multiple equilibrium points. Taking breaking loop method as an example, it firstly detects the 
positive feedback loop; secondly breaks the loop by inserting a dependent voltage source; 
thirdly sweeps the voltage source linearly and checks the output voltage at its previous 
connected node. By checking the number of intersections between the return map which is 
defined as the output signal and the input sweeping signal, the number of equilibrium points 
can be determined. An efficient method using divide and contraction algorithm are discussed 
in [65]. Rather than finding all the operating points, it searches intervals that containing extra 
equilibrium points. If there is an extra interval where a stable operating point may exist, it 
detects the presence of the Trojan state. Rather than sweeping the voltage linearly as the 
method in [48], it runs a binary search to find the intervals. Thus, it is more efficient 
compared to linearly sweeping method. However, the breaking loop method only works well 
for circuits with only one positive feedback loop. If there are many positive feedback loops 
or coupled positive feedback loops existing in the circuit, multiple loops need to be broken. 
The computation dimension is too high to run the algorithm efficiently.  
3.1.2 Temperature sweeping method 
3.1.2.1 Temperature sweeping method 
One way a simulator can be used to determine the presence of multiple equilibrium 
points is to make two dc sweeps. This takes advantage of how the simulator uses output 
results from one step to set the initial conditions for the next step in the sweep. This can be 
illustrated by considering a comparator with hysteresis. If the first sweep of the differential 
input starts with a large negative input and sweeps continuously in the positive direction and 
the second sweep starts with a large positive input and sweeps continuously in the negative 
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direction, the typical transfer characteristics shown in Figure 3-5(a) will be obtained. The two 
vertical straight lines suggest an infinite number of solutions at VIN1 and VIN2 but are not a 
part of the transfer characteristics but rather an artifact of the graphical representation of the 
simulation data. The real results from the sweep are shown in Figure 3-5(b). It shows there 
are at least two operating points for VIN1 ≤ VIN ≤ VIN2. Typically, the actual transfer 
characteristics for a simple comparator with hysteresis are shown in Figure 3-5(c). There are 
three operating points for VIN1 ≤ VIN ≤ VIN2.  
 
Figure 3-5 Hysteresis of the comparator 
In contrast to the comparator which has a voltage input, some circuits, such as bias 
generators, references, and temperature sensors, do not have any electrical inputs so the 
option of doing a bi-directional input voltage sweep does not exist. But the temperature can 
be considered to be a bi-directional sweeping parameter to help the detection of extra 
operating points in the circuit. 
The temperature sweeping method is based upon doing a homotopy-type simulation 
by conducting a bi-directional wide-range temperature sweep with a circuit simulator. 
Results similar to those depicted in Figure 3-6(a) were obtained for specific implementations 
of several popular bias generator and reference circuits with bi-directional temperature 
sweeps.  These results show a hysteresis region between temperatures T1 and T2.  The 
82 
corresponding typical actual relationship is shown in Figure 3-6(b) though it is a little bit 
tedious to obtain the region with positive slope with a simulator.  This simulation shows that 
the circuit has 3 equilibrium points at any temperature in the interval T1<T<T2.  At any 
temperature in the hysteresis interval, the upper and lower output voltages correspond to 
stable equilibrium points in the circuit and the intermediate output voltage corresponds to an 
unstable equilibrium point.  If the temperature sweep range had been narrower, for example, 
from TA to TB where T1<TA<T<TB<T2, the presence of the undesired equilibrium point 
would typically be missed. Simulations with temperature sweeps where the simulator uses 
the output at the previous temperature as an initial condition for the next temperature step 
rather than a series of independent simulations at different temperatures are necessary to 











Figure 3-6 Multiple operating points characteristics in DC Temperature sweep 
3.1.2.2 Effectiveness analysis of temperature sweeping method 
It is shown in [66]that if a static circuit has  n operating points, then (n-1)/2 operating 
points are unstable and between two adjacent stable operating points, there is one unstable 
operating point.  Applying breaking loop method to all static circuits with positive feedback 
loops, if only positive feedback loop is broken, the return map is monotone [48]. If the circuit 
has more than one operating points, multiple intersections between the return map and the 
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input sweeping signal can be observed. To show this idea briefly, a simple circuit with only 5 
transistors are taken as an example. The circuit shown in Figure 3-7  (a) is often used as a 
current reference [67] or a temperature sensor circuit [68]. As identified by method in the 
previous section, this circuit has only one positive feedback loop. It is vulnerable to multiple 
operating points.  With one configuration, the circuit has three operating points. By using the 
breaking loop method, three intersections between VIN and VOUT corresponding to three 
operating points can be observed, as shown in Figure 3-7 (e).  The slope of VOUT at any of the 
intersection points are the loop gain at that operating point. In Figure 3-7 (e), operating points 
‘p1’ and ‘p2’ are two stable operating points and the slope of VOUT  at ‘p1’ and ‘p3’ are 
smaller than 1; the operating point of ‘p2’ is an unstable operating point and the slope of 
VOUT  at ‘p2’ is larger than 1. For operating point ‘p2’, any small perturbation will make the 
circuit divergent from this operating point and converge to ‘p1’ or ‘p3’. However, since the 
existence of multiple operating points are sensitive to PVT and components variation, with 
different components configuration or condition, the circuit can have only one operating 
point with a return map as shown in Figure 3-7(c) or Figure 3-7(g).  Since the circuit’s 
performance changes from Figure 3-7(c) to Figure 3-7(e) or from Figure 3-7(e) to Figure 
3-7(g) should be continuous, with some specific configuration and condition, it exists a 
transition return map as shown in Figure 3-7 (d) or Figure 3-7(f) ideally, at which only one 
intersection point and a tangent point is present. The point of tangency is an operating point 
where the slope of ‘VOUT’ is 1. Thus, there are five possible results by applying breaking loop 





































Figure 3-7 Circuit with 5 transistors and its possible return maps; (a)The example circuit;(b) 
breaking loop method applied on the example circuit;(c) return map with only one operating 
point at p3;(d) transition return map with two operating points at p1/p2 and p3;(e) return map 
with three operating points;(f) transition return map with two operating points at p1, 
p3/p2;(g) return map with one operating point at p1. 
Now assuming the circuit is with a configuration or at a condition where the return 
map is the one shown in Figure 3-7(e) and the circuit is operating at ‘p3’. Also assuming it is 
possible to continuously change the configuration or condition (can be transistor’s size or 
temperature, etc.) while the circuit is normally operating, the circuit’s return map transfer 
characteristics can change from the one in Figure 3-7(e) to the one in Figure 3-7(g). Since 
‘p3’ is a stable operating point, any small variation in the configuration or condition will not 
move the circuit from ‘p3’ to other stable operating point besides some small value change. 
Hence, when the configuration or condition changes continuously, the circuit will stay 
around the same operating point until the circuit’s return map has passed the transition one 
shown in Figure 3-7(f) to the one in Figure 3-7(g) where only one operating point exist. 
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Thus, when the circuit’s configuration or condition changes slightly around the transition 
return map, a significant change in the operating point can be observed, from ‘p3’ to ‘p1’ in 
this case. For circuits with more feedback loops, more than three operating points can exist, 
the return maps are some different extension or superposition version of these five simple 
ones. When any circuit works at the operating point where the circuit’s loop gain is around 1, 
any variation in the components configuration or other conditions making the return map go 
across the transition ones, a significant, discontinuous change in the operating point can be 
observed. 
 A mathematical analysis about the operating point’s significant change in 
temperature domain is studied on this example circuit in Figure 3-7(a), showing when the 
circuit’s loop gain equals to 1 which is when the transition return map shown in Figure 3-7(d) 
or Figure 3-7 (f) happens, the partial derivative of the nodal voltage to the temperature is 
infinity, meaning the operating point will have a significant change. 
Assuming each device’s current can be expressed by Equation (3-1) or Equation (3-2) 
depending on types of the device, then a Taylor expansion on the temperature domain of each 
device’s current can be simplified as Equation (3-3) or (3-4) ignoring the body effect. 
                                      
GS T DS(V V ,V )D nI a f                                                                     (3-1) 
                                       
SG T(V V ,V )D p SDI a f                                                                    (3-2) 
                 
D D 0I I (T ) ( )
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    
       
     
                              (3-3)   
                 
D D 0I I (T ) ( )
SG SDD D T D
SG SG SD
V VI I V I
T T T
V T V T V T
    
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                       (3-4)         
Applying these two device current equations to the circuit in Figure 3-7(a), all the 
equations are listed. Equations (3-5) to (3-9) are the original equations, and Equation (3-10) 
to (3-14) are the simplified Taylor expansions.                                                                                                                                                                                   
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D1 1 TI (VDD VA V ,VDD VA)pa f   
                                                     (3-5) 
                                         
D2 2 TI (VDD VA V ,VDD VB)pa f                                                     (3-6) 
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5 5 T( V ,VC)D nI a f VC                                                                    (3-9) 
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                      (3-14) 
Since the device currents in the same branch are same, Equation (3-15) and (3-16) are 
obtained. 
                                                                   
D1 D3I I                                                              (3-15) 
                                                                   D2 D4 D5I I I                                                   (3-16) 
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.                                        (3-18) 
Knowing Equation (3-15) and (3-16), and the definition of ‘gm’ and ‘gds’, a matrix 
Equation (3-19) can be obtained from Equation (3-10) to (3-14). 
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                                      (3-19) 
The determinant of matrix ‘A’ in Equation (3-19) is 
( ) gm3gm 2(gm 4 4 gm5 5)
(gm1 gds3 1)(gds 2(gm 4 gds 4 gds5 gm5) (gm 4 gds 4)(gds5 gm5))
Det A gds gds
gds
    
       
             (3-20) 
Next, the loop gain of this circuit is analyzed. 
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Assuming the loop is broken at node ‘VA’, with a small input signal ‘VAin’ at the gate 
of transistor ‘M2’, the output signal can be obtained by the small signal analysis. 
          
 2 3





gds gm gds gm gds gds gds gm

    
                           (3-21) 
The loop gain is obtained as shown in Equation (3-22). 
  
gm3gm2(gm4 4 gm5 5)
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 (3-22) 
When the loop gain equals to 1, the determinant of matrix ‘A’ can be calculated, 
which equals to 0. 
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                                                                                               (3-23) 
When the circuit’s loop gain equals to 1, which means the circuit is operating at p1/p2 
if the return map same as the one shown in Figure 3-7 (d), or operating at p3/p2 if the return 
map same as the one shown in Figure 3-7(f), any change in the temperature which making 
the circuit’s return map transfer from Figure 3-7(d) to Figure 3-7(c) or from Figure 3-7(f) to 
Figure 3-7(g) will make the circuit’s operating point have a significant change. 
Thus, if sweeping the temperature in a very large range, the circuit’s return map’s 
gradual change can go through all the transition ones; if the circuit operates around the point 
which is the tangent point in the coming return map, and then a significant change in the 
operating point can be observed abruptly. Furthermore, if sweeping the temperature forward 
and backward in a large range, the circuit meets two different transition return maps 
congaing the tangent points, and the circuit has operated at two different points which are 
close to two corresponding tangent points in the transition return maps respectively, a 
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hysteresis window can be observed in the checked output node voltage. 
3.1.2.3 Applications of temperature sweeping method on circuits with multiple 
operating points 
Several example circuits including circuits with only one feedback loop and circuits 
with coupled feedback loops are applied by this bi-directional temperature sweeping method, 
and the existence of one extra stable operating point and its vulnerable temperature range are 
identified by the simulation results. 
To make all the simulations easy to be replicated, all the circuits in this chapter are 
designed and simulated in 0.5u ON and the supply voltage is 5V. The circuit in Figure 3-7(a) 
with configuration shown in Table 3-1 is simulated by sweeping the temperature in a very 
large range bi-directionally and a hysteresis window can be observed. It shows the by-
directional temperature sweeping simulation result in Figure 3-8 (a). With the configuration 
in Table 3-1 the circuit has at least two stable operating points in temperature 53˚C to 188˚C. 
The real equilibrium transfer characteristic in the temperature domain with all equilibriums in 
the circuit is shown in Figure 3-8 (b), which can be obtained with one extra simulation and 
initial condition setting. The equilibrium point in the middle of the hysteresis window is the 
unstable operating point at that temperature. At  53˚C to 188˚C, the returned maps if obtained 
have the tangent point. 
Table 3-1 Sizes of transistors in Figure 3-7(a) 
M1 4.5u/1.8u M2 4.5u/1.8u 



















Figure 3-8 Simulation results of circuit in Fig.3(a) with size in Table 1;(a) bi-directional 
temperature sweeping simulation results;(b) real equilibrium transfer characteristics in 
temperature domain 
This method can also work to detect extra equilibrium points in circuits with multiple 
positive feedback loops. A circuit in Figure 3-9 is simulated as examples to show the 


























Figure 3-9 A Circuit with multiple positive feedback loop 
The circuit in Figure 3-9 is simulated with size configuration shown in Table 3-2. As 
shown in Figure 3-10, it has at least two stable equilibrium points in temperature 63˚ to 190˚. 
The desired stable operating point at ‘Vref’ is about 1.2V and the undesired operating point is 
about 5V. 
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Table 3-2 Sizes of the transistors in Figure 3-9 
M0 12u/1.2u M1 12u/1.2u M2 12u/1.2u 
M3 12u/1.2u M4 2(12u/1.2u) M5 2(12u/1.2u) 
M6 6(6u/0.9u) M7 6(6u/0.9u) M8 4(6u/0.9u) 
M9 4(6u/0.9u) M10 12(6u/1.2u) M11 2(3u/3u) 
M12 2(3u/3u) M13 1.5u/6u M14 2(3u/1.2u) 
M15 2(1.5u/1.2u) M16 1.5u/1.2u M17 2(3u/3u) 











Figure 3-10 Simulation results of circuit in  Figure 3-9 with size in Table 3-2 
The circuit in Figure 3-11 is implemented with same size configuration of same 
numbered transistors in Table 3-2 and three extra transistors’ sizes are shown in Table 3-3. 
By doing a bi-directional wide-range temperature sweeping simulation in Cadence, a 
hysteresis window is also observed shown in Figure 3-12 . These two circuits have multiple 
and coupled positive feedback loops. Using breaking loop method, at least two nodes need to 
be broken. Even using the method introduced in [65], the high dimensional computation 
makes it inefficient to detect the problem, not to say to consider the temperature’s variation. 
But with temperature bi-directional temperature sweeping method, the extra equilibrium and 































Figure 3-11 Cascode bias of circuit in Figure 3-9 














Figure 3-12 Simulation results of circuit in Figure 3-11 
Examples have shown that the bi-directional temperature sweeping method can detect 
presence of undesired operating points in a very efficient and convenient way. It can not only 
show undesired operating point but also show the vulnerable temperature range where the 
extra operating points exist. Different to other methods trying to find all existing equilibrium 
points, this method only finds one extra equilibrium point. Though with more simulations 
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combined with some initial condition setting, other equilibrium points can also be obtained, it 
is already good enough by using this method since the goal is only to identify if there is at 
least an extra operating point existing. 
3.1.2.4 Discussion on issue of temperature sweeping method 
The temperature sweeping method works relying on that the circuit operates at two 
different operating points at the extreme low temperature and extreme high temperature. 
However, this method will fail to show the hysteresis window or the significantly change in 
node voltages if circuits have the same operating point at low temperature and high 
temperature, but multiple equilibrium points exist in the middle temperature range. 
For the circuit in Figure 3-7(a), when sweeping the temperature forward and 
backward, if the circuit meets all the return maps in Figure 3-7, a hysteresis window is 
guaranteed to be observed. However, with some specific configuration, as shown in  Table 
3-4, only three of the five return maps can be met in the large temperature range, and two of 
them are met twice, as shown in Figure 3-13, while the real equilibrium point transfer 
characteristic in temperature domain is shown in Figure 3-14. 
Table 3-4 Sizes of transistors in Figure 3-7(a) 
M1 5(3u/3u) M2 5(3u/3u) 
M3 1.5u/3u M4 2(1.95u/1.8u) 


























Figure 3-13 The sketch return map’s transformation of the circuit in Fig.3(a) with size in 









Figure 3-14 The real equilibrium transfer characteristic in temperature domain of circuit in 
Fig.3(a) with size in Table 3-4 
By using the bi-directional temperature sweeping method on the five-transistor circuit 
with sizes in Table 3-4, only when the circuit is firstly operating at ‘p3’ or ‘p2’, an abruptly 
change in the operating point can be observed. If the simulation starts from a very low 
temperature firstly, the circuit should work around ‘p1’. Since ‘p1’ is always existing and 
stable in all the coming return maps, the circuit will keep stay at that operating point when 
the temperature goes to very high and backwards to very low, and no hysteresis window or 
any significant change can be observed, as shown in Figure 3-14 . The undesired equilibrium 
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points are isolated from the desired stable equilibrium point in the temperature domain. Thus, 
by only using this method, the existence of multiple operating points cannot be successfully 
identified. But if combined with breaking loop method or other verification methods, the 
temperature sweeping method can still work well and speed up the verification process 
showing the vulnerable temperature range even if the equilibrium points transfer 
characteristic similar to the one shown in Figure 3-14. For example, it can be done by firstly 
using breaking loop method to detect the presence of extra equilibrium points at each single 
temperature. Once the existence is detected at one temperature, using node set to set initial 
condition to help the circuit converge to ‘p3’ and running a bi- directional temperature 
sweeping simulation, the verification of equilibrium’s and its temperature information can be 
obtained.  
Experiments have been done on this circuit and other circuits showing a hysteresis 
window can be observed by using bi-directional temperature sweeping method for circuits 
with most possible size configurations. The equilibrium points transfer characteristic like in 
Figure 3-14 has only observed in two circuit structures right now and happens only in a very 
narrow size configuration region. 
3.2 Method to detect PAAST Trojans in dynamic system 
Transient simulations with standard circuit simulators can help designers observe and 
analyze dynamic modes of operation of a nonlinear circuit. However, simulators provide only 
one operating mode with a single transient simulation. The initial conditions set at the 
beginning of simulation determine the mode of operation observed. Only with right setting of 
the initial conditions, the Trojan state can be observed. Otherwise it will always converge to 
the desired dynamic state in each single simulation. Thus, it is very difficult to detect the 
existence of Trojan modes of operation with a transient simulation. Even if it is known that a 
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Trojan operating mode exists, it can be difficult to verify the mode with transient simulations 
unless appropriate initial conditions are set. And, the problem of finding a dynamic Trojan 
operating mode or Trojan operating modes can be even more challenging if it is not known 
whether or not one or more Trojan operating modes actually exist.   
3.2.1 One dynamic mode is one orbit in the phase plane 
For dynamic circuits with multiple operating modes, the transient response of any 
circuit is completely determined by the initial conditions on all of the energy storage 
elements. The initial conditions are voltage on the energy storage elements. If the dynamic 
nonlinear system has a static Trojan state, it is one point in the initial condition domain. Any 
of the existing stationary dynamic modes of operation of the dynamic system is a stationary 
periodic orbit in the initial condition domain. If the stationary modes of operation of a 
dynamic nonlinear system are either equilibrium points or stationary periodic orbits, the 
transient response for any set of initial conditions in an arbitrarily small interval in the initial 
condition domain will converge to one of the stationary modes of operation. In what follows 
the terms “stationary periodic orbit” and “orbit” will be used interchangeably. If there are 
two energy storage elements, the initial condition domain is often termed as a two-
dimensional phase plane. The initial condition domain can be partitioned into mutually 
exclusive subdomains whereby each subdomain can be associated with a unique equilibrium 
point or a unique stationary orbit to which the circuit will enter if a transient response starts 
with the initial conditions inside the subdomain. These subdomains can be viewed as 
domains of attraction to the associated equilibrium point or orbit. If a circuit has been 
designed to have a single stationary orbit, then any other stationary equilibrium points or any 
other stationary orbits can be viewed as a Trojan mode of operation. The phase plane for a 
second order nonlinear system with two stationary orbits is depicted in Figure 3-15(a). 
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Figure 3-15  Phase plane for 2nd order nonlinear system with Trojan mode of oscillation. 
If the system has two energy storage elements, both capacitors, the coordinate 
variables in the phase plane could be the voltage across the capacitors. If the system is 
designed to have a single periodic orbit, the other undesired periodic orbit corresponds to a 
Trojan mode of operation. In Figure 3-15(b), the domains of attraction for each of the two 
orbits are shown. If initial conditions on the energy storage elements are in the domain of 
attraction of the outer orbit, the steady state response will trace out the outer orbit and if 
initial conditions on the energy storage elements are in the domain of attraction of the inner 
orbit, the steady state response will trace out the inner orbit. 
3.2.2 The sequential transient simulation with one-dimensional initial condition 
scanning method 
If a Trojan mode of operation exists, one method of identifying this mode is to 
conduct a transient simulation with initial conditions that are in the domain of attraction of 
the Trojan mode of operation. But, since it will be assumed that it is not known whether a 
Trojan mode of operation exists, it is not known whether there is a domain of attraction for 
some Trojan operating mode.  And it is also not known what region the Trojan domain of 


















Figure 3-16 Circuit diagram to set and scan initial condition on the energy storage elements. 
A simple and naive strategy that can be useful for determining whether a Trojan mode 
exists is to scan the initial condition domain with sufficient granularity during transient 
simulation such that at least one point in the initial condition scan set is in the domain of 
attraction of a Trojan mode. Then, by sequentially doing transient simulations using all 
points in this scan set as initial conditions, it can be observed from the output of the 
simulations whether a Trojan equilibrium point or a dynamic Trojan operating mode exists. 
The circuit shown in Figure 3-16 is the one used to scan the initial condition on one energy 
storage element during the transient simulation. The “Vpluse” generates a periodic signal 
with very narrow duty cycle to control the switch and set initial condition on the energy 
storage element. When the switch is off, the oscillator circuit is normally operating. The 
“Vramp” is a slow ramp signal generating the initial conditions which will be sampled when 
the switch is on. 
Conceptually, if the system has the phase plane characteristics depicted in Figure 
3-15, it would be necessary to select at least one point in the domain of attraction of the 
Trojan mode in the scan set. For second order dynamic circuits, orbits will often be 
concentric and the static equilibrium point or quiescent point will often be internal to the 
inner-most orbit. Thus, rather than scanning all possible initial conditions in the two-
dimensional phase plane, a one-dimensional initial condition scanning with any angle to the 
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axis which intersects with the quiescent point of the circuit is enough to guarantee to find all 
the stationary modes of operation. In second order dynamic systems, the appearance of the 
orbit is predictable. However, for higher order dynamic systems, the shape or appearance of 
the stationary periodical orbits is usually unimaginable. Even, the one-dimensional linear 
scan would be adequate for determining the presence or absence of Trojan operating modes 
in second order dynamic circuits, a high dimensional transient simulation scan is usually 
necessary for other systems that have multiple energy storage elements, if the phase plane is 
more than two dimensions. In this section, the sequential transient simulation with one 
dimensional initial condition scanning method is presented. The one-dimensional initial 
condition scan can be any random angle to the axis, but in this section, the one-dimensional 
initial condition scan is along the axis for easy implementation and explanation. It is efficient 
to find all existing stationary modes in second order dynamic systems and also valid on some 
circuits with higher order dimensions. Two examples will be given to demonstrate this 
method of identifying Trojan dynamic modes. One is an analog circuit using the popular 
Wien-bridge oscillator architecture and the second is an injection-locked ring-oscillator that 
can be used for clock generation in digital systems. 
3.2.3 Trojan mode identification on Wien bridge oscillator circuit 
As an example for demonstrating this method of dynamic Trojan detection, consider 
the circuit shown in Fig.4 which is a Wien-bridge oscillator. 
In an ideal Wien-bridge oscillator the gain of the base amplifier is 3 but to sustain 
oscillation, control signal amplitude and reduce distortion, an amplifier with a nonlinear gain 
is required. The gain of this base amplifier is generally greater than 3 for small outputs but 
less than 3 for larger outputs. A nonlinearity has been explicitly inserted into the base 
amplifier with the parallel diode/dc source blocks shown in the Base Amplifier of Figure 
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3-17. The nonlinearity is created by combinations of diodes and resistors. The dc sources are 
used to adjust the threshold voltage of the diodes. In this example, the nonlinearity is 
modeled on the resistors in the amplifier, it can also exist in the OPAMP and the resistors on 
the RC part.  To build this example circuit with multiple stationary oscillating states existing, 
the nonlinearity characteristics in the base amplifier should be molded as shown in Figure 
3-18. There should be multiple transfer regions existing where the gain is larger than 3 or 






























Figure 3-18 Nonlinear transfer characteristics of base amplifier 
A circuit was implemented by using actual diodes in the base amplifier. The local 
gain (slope of transfer characteristics) of the base amplifier is shown in Figure 3-19. The 
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knots in the transfer characteristics that were explicitly shown in the drawing of Figure 3-18 
would cause step functions in the gain with ideal diodes but the actual diodes used in the 
circuit resulted in the continuous gain change shown in Figure 3-19. 
 
Figure 3-19 Gain of base amplifier used in prototype Wien-bridge oscillator 
Since there are two capacitors in the oscillator circuit in Figure 3-17 where initial 
conditions can be set, a two-dimensional initial condition scan set with fine resolution could 
be used to identify any orbits that may exist. But since the origin is often internal to 
concentric orbits, a one-dimensional scan along one of the coordinate axis was used. In this 
circuit, the supply voltage is VSS=-2.5V, VDD=+2.5V, if the resolution of the initial 
condition scanning is 0.2V. It needs to run 625 transient simulations to do a two-dimensional 
initial condition scanning. The one-dimensional initial condition scanning will fast the 
detection a lot. If the common mode voltage is known as (0,0) in this circuit, only 12 or 13 
simulations are enough to achieve the same results by the 625 simulations with two-
dimensional initial condition scanning.    
In the implementation of the sequential transient initial condition scanning method on 
this circuit, the one-dimensional initial condition scanning starts from VDD to VSS, 
containing 25 points of the phase plane, in case the common mode voltage is unknown.  The 
101 
initial condition setting circuit on the two-energy storage element is shown in Figure 3-20. 
The ‘Vpulse’ generates 25 periodical ‘glitches’ to control the switch. When ‘Vpulse’ is high, 
the switch is on, the initial condition is sampled on C1 and C2 instantly. When ‘Vpulse’ is 
low, the Wien bridge oscillator circuit will re-start to oscillate from the new initial 
conditions. As shown in Figure 3-20, the initial condition sampled on C2 is always ‘0V’ 
while the initial condition on C1 is swept from VSS to VDD with a resolution determined by 










Figure 3-20 Initial condition setting circuit on C1 and C2 of Wien bridge oscillator 
The initial conditions were sequentially set so that a single transient response 
simulation that included all 25 individual transient simulations could be run. The transient 
response for the entire simulation is shown in Figure 3-21. The presence of the 3 orbits is 
apparent by observing VOUT in this plot. An expanded segment of the transient response for 
each of the 3 modes at VOUT is shown in Figure 3-22. The output waveforms have only 
small differences in frequency but significant differences in amplitude.   
The orbit results of the sequential transient one-dimensional initial condition scan is 
shown in a zoomed-in phase plane of Figure 3-23.  To show clearly the orbits, the phase 
plane is only captured from -1V to 1V in x-axis, from -1.5V to 1.5V in t y-axis rather than 






Figure 3-21Simulation results from one-dimensional scan of initial conditions 
 






















































Figure 3-23 Simulated phase-plane plot for Wien bridge oscillator shown two dynamic 
Trojan modes of operation 
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Figure 3-24 Phase plot for Wien bridge oscillator showing domains of attraction for 3 orbits    
In Figure 3-23, the voltages on the capacitors C1 and C2 of the three existing 
dynamic modes are plotted. These simulation results show 3 orbits that differ significantly in 
amplitude. In this design, the desired orbit is labeled as Orbit 1. The two Trojan dynamic 
operating modes are denoted as Orbit 2 and Orbit 3. The corresponding domains of attraction 
for all three orbits were obtained by repeating the sequential transient simulation with initial 
conditions along different axis. They are shown in Figure 3-24. Though the domains of 
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attraction for the Trojan modes of operation can be quite large, designers may not naturally 
observe these modes during design and verification unless the initial conditions were 
specifically set to include a point in the corresponding domains of attraction throughout the 
design and verification process. . Otherwise, the circuit will always naturally converge one 
mode of operation and mislead the designers about the existence of Trojan modes. In the scan 
set, there were 25 sets of initial conditions selected corresponding to equally spaced values 
for the initial condition voltage on C2 with the initial condition voltage on C1 being kept at 
0V. Of these 25, 2 were in the domain of convergence for Orbit 1, 2 were in the domain of 
convergence of Orbit 2, and the remaining 21 were in the domain of convergence of Orbit 3. 
Compared to the use of the naïve initial condition sweeping method which needs to run 625 
transient simulations, the one dimensional initial condition transient simulation is more 
efficient. 
3.3.4 Trojan mode identification on three stage coupled ring oscillator 
Consider the injection locked ring oscillator of Figure 3-25 (c). It was reported in [46] 
that this circuit can have 2 modes of oscillation for some implementations of the inverters. 
This structure can be viewed as two 3-stage ring oscillators with one comprised of the upper 
three inverters in a loop and the second comprised of the lower three inverters in a loop. The 
two 3- stage ring oscillators are ideally identical and are comprised of inverters designated as 
I1 in the schematic. The injection locking is due to the symmetric cross-coupled inverters 
designated on the schematic with the inverters labeled as I2. It will be assumed that the drive 
strength of the I1 inverters is much stronger than that of the cross-coupled inverters that 
cause the injection locking. An implementation of the inverters that comprise the ring-
oscillators designed in the AMI 0.6μ CMOS process is shown in Figure 3-25(a) with the 










I1 Inverters I2 Inverters
VDD=2.5V
VSS=-2.5v














Figure 3-25 Implementation of inverters comprising injection-locked oscillator 
      With the basic 2-transistor inverters of Figure 3-25, the oscillator has 6 nodes labeled V1, 
... V6 in addition to the biasing voltages VDD and VSS and thus the initial conditions on all 
capacitors can be set by setting the initial conditions on these 6 internal nodes. But since 
there are 6 initial condition nodes, the initial condition domain is a 6-dimensional space 
making it computationally impractical to scan this entire initial condition space with fine 
granularity. Due to the symmetric characteristics, to reduce the computational requirements, 
the one-dimension initial condition scan will be implemented in an attempt to identify the 
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Trojan modes of operation in this circuit with the goal of obtaining at least one initial 
condition in the domain of attraction to a Trojan orbit in the circuit.      
Consider now a one-dimensional initial condition sequence   
comprised of 2N initial conditions defined by Table 3-5 . 
Table 3-5 A one-dimensional initial condition sequence of 
 Initial Condition Sequence 
index V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
1 VSS VSS 0 0 0 0 
2 VSS+Δ VSS+Δ 0 0 0 0 
3 VSS+2Δ VSS+2Δ 0 0 0 0 
…. …. …. 0 0 0 0 
N-1 VDD-2Δ VDD-2Δ 0 0 0 0 
N VDD-Δ VDD-Δ 0 0 0 0 
N+1 VDD VDD 0 0 0 0 
N+2 VSS VDD-Δ 0 0 0 0 
N+3 VSS+Δ VDD-2Δ 0 0 0 0 
…. …… …… 0 0 0 0 
2N-1 VDD-2Δ VSS+2Δ 0 0 0 0 
2N VDD-Δ VSS+Δ 0 0 0 0 
where Δ=(VDD-VSS)/N is the step size and where V1 is swept first up from VSS to 
VDD and then down from VDD to VSS. V2 is swept first from VSS to VDD and then re-
swept again from VSS to VDD. With this one-dimensional initial condition sequence, the 
voltage sources used to set initial conditions in the simulator can be a triangle generator V1 
and a saw-tooth generator V2. One implementation of an initial condition waveform 
generator that can generate this input sequence is shown in Figure 3-26 where the pulse 
generator is used to set the sequence of initial conditions.  Simulation results of a sequence of 
transient responses with the initial condition sequence defined above are shown in Figure 
3-27. In this transient simulation, the width of the pulses that set the initial conditions were 
all 180ns. The ramp-up time of the saw tooth generator was 2us and the total ramp-up and 
ramp-down time of the triangle waveform generator was 4us. From the simulation results, 
1 2 3 4 5 6VV V V V V 
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two modes can be observed by noting the small change in the amplitudes of V1 and V2 that 
occurs after the 2μsec mark in the transient analysis. The signal difference between V1 and 
V2 are generated in transient simulation which is shown in Figure 3-28, during the first 
2μsec, the difference is constant as zero, which implies that the two signals are exactly 
overlapped. In the second 2μsec, the signal difference looks like a sinewave which means 
signal at V1 and V2 are out of phase. The actual time-domain waveform corresponding to the 
two modes for this circuit are shown in Figure 3-29. From these results the two stationary 
operating modes or orbits are apparent. In one mode the corresponding symmetric outputs are 
in-phase which is the desired mode in this design and in the other mode they are out-of-
phase, which is the Trojan mode. The peak to peak amplitude of the out-of-phase orbit is 
about 4V and the oscillating frequency is 1.38GHz whereas the peak-to peak amplitude of 








Figure 3-26. Initial condition generator circuit 
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Orbit 1 Orbit 2
 
Figure 3-27 Transient simulation results with initial condition scan for injection locked 3-
stage ring oscillator 
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Figure 3-28 Difference between V1 and V2 in transient simulation showing 2 orbits 
 
Figure 3-29 Output of oscillator at nodes V1 and V2 
It was reported in [46] that this circuit has two modes (or orbits) and the initial 
condition-based scanning algorithm was effective at identifying these two modes. Though 
there is no reported evidence of any additional modes in this circuit nor any suggestion that 
any additional modes may exist, we cannot claim that we have found all modes in this circuit 
with this one-dimensional scan, but rather we can only claim that we have identified two 
modes with this one-dimension scanning and with this initial condition scanning resolution. 
If one of these two modes are the desired state, the other one is the Trojan state. By using this 
method, the existence of the Trojan state is being successfully identified. 
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The initial condition scanning method works well for nonlinear systems with two 
energy storage elements since the initial condition domain is at-most a 2-dimensional space. 
Usually depends on the circuit structure, a one-dimensional scanning is enough. It may 
appear that this approach will become impractical if there are a large number of energy 
storage elements since the size of the initial condition space will become very large. 
However, many useful wave-form generator circuits that may be vulnerable to the presence 
of one or more dynamic Trojan modes of operation will often have considerable symmetry 
and regularity. For example, the injection locked signal generator of Figure 3-25 (c) is 
symmetric from top to bottom and regular from left to right. In such structures, a practical 
one-dimensional initial condition scan that exploits the symmetry and regularity may often be 
sufficient to achieve the goal of having at least one initial condition point in the domain of 
attraction for each orbit. The one-dimensional scan for the injection locked ring oscillator 
was effective at identifying the two reported modes for this circuit. 
 













CHAPTER 4.    SIDE CHANNEL TRIGGER AND MEASUREMENT RESULTS ON 
PAAST TROJANS  
4.1 Side channel trigger mechanism 
Circuits with multiple modes of operation have been reported and concerns about the 
undesired modes carrying PAAST hardware Trojans were raised in previous chapters. In this 
chapter, trigger mechanism for PAAST Trojans will be introduced. The proposed side 
channel Trigger mechanism will unmask the PAAST properties. Even though the PAAST 
Trojans can be triggered with the addition of trigger circuits, the existence of trigger circuits 
could likely be used to compromise the cover of the PAAST Trojans. Although, it can also be 
triggered during use through noise, temperature or other operating conditions variation 
randomly, it is not easy to make these trigger mechanisms controllable. In this chapter, 
trigger methods that are also PAAST and easy to control will be introduced.  These triggers 
are based upon a side-channel approach that can be used to trigger the Trojans on demand 
without any power, circuit, or area overhead. Two examples showing side channel triggers 
based upon PAAST Trojans incorporated as redundant dynamic operating modes of 
oscillator circuits will be given. 
4.1.1 PAAST trigger mechanism for Wien-Bridge oscillator with embedded PAAST 
Trojan 
It was discussed that the Wien bridge oscillator circuit of Figure 4-1 can be designed 
to have one or more redundant stationary dynamic modes of operation.  The redundant mode 
or modes of operation are attributable to the specific nonlinearity in the finite-gain feedback 
amplifier that is used to limit signal amplitude and control spectral performance.  Redundant 
modes of operation can also be introduced by incorporating a nonlinearity in the RC part of 
the circuit.  For example, if the finite gain amplifier has the gain nonlinearity (magnified for 
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illustrative purposes) shown in Figure 4-2, the Wien bridge oscillator circuit can have two 
stationary dynamic modes of oscillation. The undesired oscillating mode is a Trojan mode. 
Since the frequency is mainly determined by the RC part of the circuit, the oscillating 
frequencies of these two modes are almost the same but the amplitudes of the two oscillating 
modes can be very different. Simulation results showing the two modes of operation obtained 
from an implementation of this circuit are shown in Figure 4-3.  The nonlinearities in the 
finite gain amplifier were introduced by incorporating diode limiters (not shown) in the 
resistor R1’. In this design, the desired mode has a peak to peak amplitude of 2V while the 



























Figure 4-3 Two operating modes of  Wien bridge oscillator 
 
Figure 4-4 Orbits of Wien bridge oscillator 
 When the supply voltage of this circuit normally ramps up, the circuit will naturally 
converge to the desired operating mode due to the fact that when the circuit is off, the initial 
conditions on the two capacitors are naturally set to around 0V which is inside the inner orbit 
and thus inherently in the domain of attraction of the desired mode of operation as can be 
seen from Figure 4-4.  Even with considerable noise present during start-up, the circuit will 
still converge to the desired state since the initial conditions are far away from the domain of 
attraction of the Trojan mode of operation. Thus, during standard simulations and verification 
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as well as standard testing, the circuit will invariably show operation in the desired mode 
making it difficult to even be aware of the existence of the Trojan mode of operation.  
However, the Trojan state really exists and can be triggered on demand with a side-channel 
trigger during its normal mode of operation.    
 
Figure 4-5 Side-channel trigger of Wien bridge oscillator 
Figure 4-5 shows simulation results of a specific side-channel trigger.  The trigger is 
based upon applying a pulse of specific height and width on the VSS bus.  Prior to triggering, 
the circuit is operating in the desired oscillation mode with a peak to peak amplitude of 2V.  
After triggering the circuit is operating in the Trojan mode with a peak to peak amplitude of 
5V.  This pulse on the VSS bus establishes an initial condition on the energy storage 
elements that is in the domain of attraction of the Trojan operating mode and this is what 
causes the circuit to transition from the desired mode to the Trojan mode when the side-
channel trigger is applied.  
Though not shown in the simulation, a side channel trigger can also be used to trigger 
the oscillator to switch between the Trojan mode and the desired mode of oscillation.  Thus, 
an adversary could momentarily switch the circuit to operate in the Trojan mode and then 
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return it to operate in the desired mode.  If this were to occur, it might be difficult for the user 
to even recognize that the circuit operation had been compromised yet the payload may have 
been delivered during the time interval when it was operating in the Trojan mode.   
      It should be apparent that this side-channel trigger mechanism is power, area, architecture 
and signature transparent.  Since both the Trojan and the trigger mechanism are PAAST, 
detection of the Trojan can be extremely challenging. Though this example has a domain of 
attraction to the Trojan state that is rather large, judicious design of the circuit can make the 
domain of attraction of the Trojan mode arbitrary small making detection even more difficult. 
4.1.2 PAAST trigger mechanism for three-stage injection-locked oscillator with PAAST 
Trojan 
As reported in  Chapter 3, the circuit in Figure 4-6 can be designed to have two 
oscillating modes. In one mode, the signals at nodes ‘V1’ and ‘V2’ are in-phase while in the 
other mode the signals at nodes ‘V1’ and ‘V2’ are 180˚ out of phase. Besides the difference 
in phase, the oscillating frequency and peak to peak amplitudes are also different. When the 
circuit is in use, if the desired mode is the first mode described above, then the Trojan mode 
is the one where the signals at ‘V1’ and ‘V2’ are out of phase.  Likewise, if the desired mode 
is the second mode, then the Trojan mode corresponds to in-phase signals. In this work, it 
will be assumed that the circuit has been designed to generate two oscillating signals which 
are 180˚ out of phase.  An implementation of the circuit designed in a 0.5µm CMOS process 
is shown in Figure 4-6. In this implementation, the circuit will naturally start up to the 




























Figure 4-6 Implementation of injection-locked ring oscillator 
Additional capacitors have been added to all nodes in the circuit to make the 
oscillating frequency easy to control. Thus, when the supply voltage naturally ramps up, the 
circuit will naturally converge to the desired oscillating mode.  Even with noise existence, the 
circuit is robust to start up to the desired mode of operation. By using standard simulator to 
verify the circuit, only the desired oscillating mode can be observed; the existence of the 
Trojan mode is unknown to the designers. When the circuit is normally started up and 
operated in the desired mode, by using a PAAST side- channel trigger mechanism on the 
supply bus, the circuit can be triggered to the Trojan mode on demand. 
Simulation results of this oscillator are shown in Figure 4-7. After start-up, the circuit 
is operating in the desired mode where the signals at nodes ‘V1’ and ‘V2’ are out of phase 
with peak to peak amplitude and oscillating frequency of 4V and 55MHz respectively.   By 
applying a pulse to the VSS supply bus at ‘t=1.4usec’ of duration 30nsec, the oscillator is 
triggered into the stationary Trojan mode of operation where the signals denoted as ‘V1’ and 
‘V2’ are in phase and with peak to peak amplitude and frequency of 4.8V and 38MHz 
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respectively. This serves as a side-channel trigger for this injection-locked oscillator. During 
the period when the trigger is added to the supply bus, all the inverters are out of function 
and voltages across the parasitic capacitors are being reset. After the supply voltage comes 
back to the normal level, the circuit’s final oscillating state is determined by the new initial 
conditions, Thus, it can change from the desired state to the Trojan state.  Though not shown 
in the simulation results, a second side-channel trigger pulse can be used to trigger the circuit 
to return to the desired mode of operation.  
In this injection locked three stage ring oscillator circuit, the existence of Trojan 
modes is inherently because of its coupled and injection locked structure. In some 
applications, injection locking technique is used to eliminate clock skews around a large chip 
area or to generate quadrature phase signals. In coupling the oscillator circuits, the desired 
performance can be achieved but a Trojan oscillating mode is introduced without knowing. 
Since there are no extra circuits added to insert Trojans or for trigging mechanism, these 
types of Trojans with the side channel trigger mechanism are transparent to power, area, 
circuit architecture and signatures. 
 
Figure 4-7 Side-channel trigger of injection-locked ring oscillator 
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4.2 Measurement results of PAAST Trojans in two dynamic circuits 
Two dynamic circuits introduced in this dissertation are built with commercial 
products and measured in lab. In each of the circuits, two oscillating states can be observed, 
and once Trojan trigger mechanism is applied during the normal operation, the circuit’s 
oscillating state will change from the desired one to the Trojan oscillating state. 
The Sallen-key structure-based oscillator circuit is built with UA741 OPAMP, 
resistors, capacitors and diodes. The nonlinearity in the amplifier shown in Figure 4-8 is 
generated by the combination of resistors and diodes. The measured result shown in Figure 
4-9 displays when the trigger mechanism is applied, the oscillating state changes from the 
normal state to the Trojan state. The two oscillating states have significantly different 
amplitudes.  In this circuit, the large amplitude state is assumed as the desired state, and the 
state with small peak to peak amplitude is the Trojans state. In Figure 4-9, it shows a one-
second-long measurement results in Figure 4-9 (b) and two zoomed in results in Figure 4-9 
(b) and (c). In Figure 4-9 (b) and Figure 4-9 (c), it shows that during normal operation the 













Figure 4-9 Measurement results of Sallen-key structure based oscillator circuit; (a) 
Measurement results for the whole triggering time;(b) results of triggering the circuit from 





Figure 4-10 Measurement results of three stage coupled ring oscillator circuit; (a) in-phase 
mode; (b) out of phase mode 
A three-stage coupled ring oscillator circuit is implemented with multiple CD4049UB 
devices, which are inverting hex buffers. As shown in Figure 4-10, two oscillating states are 
observed. For the measured results in Figure 4-10 (a), it shows the oscillating signals at ‘V1’ 
and ‘V2’ are in phase, and the oscillating frequency is about 8MHz. However, when the 
initial condition changes, a second mode of operation can be triggered as shown in Figure 
4-10.  Signals at ‘V1’ and ‘V2’ are 180˚ out of phase, and the oscillating frequency is around 
23MHz. 
Shown by the two built circuits and the measured results, Trojans in analog circuits 
can be easily inserted, and without any extra circuitry, area, power overhead. Once triggered, 
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the circuit will work at the Trojan state and result in severe problems. Additionally, the 
adversary can trigger the Trojan to occur only in a very short of time and then trigger it back 
to the normal state as shown in Figure 4-9 (c), making it more difficult to detect even it has 
already been triggered. 
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CHAPTER 5.    COUNTERFEIT COUNTERMEASURES WITH SUBTHRESHOLD 
AUTHENTICATION UNDER-CIRCUITS 
To reduce the entry barrier for COTS manufacturers to include authentication 
circuitry and eliminate the financial incentives for the production of counterfeit 
countermeasures, a PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) circuit which can generate random 
bits of sequence for authentication is proposed.  The PUF circuit is a circuit which is 
unclonable because of the physical mismatches on each PUF cell is random. By exploiting 
the physical mismatches, unique code sequence as a fingerprint for the IC can be generated.  
What is unique in the proposed approach is not the PUF but   the proposed solution 
requires no additional pins, no silicon area overhead, and does not affect the normal 
operation of the circuit. Furthermore, once a basic authentication core is created, the 
approach should be directly applicable to a wide range of COTS components over multiple 
technology nodes with little or no additional design effort required.  This will be realized by 
utilizing the area underneath existing bonding pads to build an “under-circuit” and using 
existing pins for reading the fingerprint obtained from the PUF.  To avoid affecting the 
characteristics of the original device, the PUF circuit will turn itself off when a circuit 
receives a normal supply voltage. The PUF circuit along with its I/O will be activated when 
the supply voltage is around one half the normal ‘Vdd’ by operating all devices in the under-
circuit in the subthreshold (weak inversion) region. 
Traditional PUF circuits often take advantage of a group of multi-paralleled delay 
paths to generate the unique key sequence [69][70]. In this implementation, the core of the 
PUF circuit is a dynamic shift register loop operating in weak inversion region with a latch 
cell [71] as the PUF unit. Depending on the physical random mismatches on DFF’s, it can 
generate a unique key directly without any use of the delay timing comparison or any MUXs. 
123 
Besides the supply, it doesn’t need extra ‘Challenge’ to weak up the PUF circuit. Thus, no 
input pin is needed. The PUF circuit will be powered when the supply voltage is around one 
half of the normal supply, where the COTS IC usually doesn’t work. It uses the original IC’s 
supply, ground, and output pins without any disturbance to the IC’s normal performance. 
Hence, this PUF circuit doesn’t need any extra pins and it has almost no interaction with the 
COTS IC circuit during normal operation.  The authentication under-circuit was designed in 
an IBM 0.13u process with a normal supply voltage of 1.2V.  The total area for the 
authentication under-circuit comprised of a 20-bit comma and a 64-bit PUF is around 
90umx90um, which is about 85% of the area required for a single bonding PAD in this 
process. 
5.1 The operation of the authentication under-circuit 
A block diagram of the authentication under-circuit is shown in Figure 5-1. The 3-pin 
authentication circuit shares the supply pin, a digital output pin, and ground pin with those of 
the original IC. A threshold trigger circuit is set to trigger around 75% of the normal supply 
voltage and is used to turn on three PMOS switches to activate the under-circuit. The clock 
circuit is a weak inversion ring oscillator and is used to clock the shift register loop to the 
output. The shift register loop is designed with a sequence of flip flops. The initial condition 
on all flip flops in the shift register are determined by random mismatch of minimum-sized 
inverters, thus the shift register is actually also the PUF circuit. A fixed sequence generated 
by deterministic DFF’s appended in the shift register loop will serve as a “Comma” for extra 























3-pin subthreshold authentication undercircuits
 
Figure 5-1 The implementation diagram of authentication circuit 
If the applied voltage is at the normal IC supply voltage, the threshold trigger circuit 
outputs a high-level signal that controls the PMOS switches.  These switches will prevent the 
shift register based PUF circuit and the clock circuit from drawing power during the IC’s 
normal operation and also prevent the PUF circuit from affecting the output of the IC. This 
isolation allows the authentication circuit to share the same pins as the IC, which saves on die 
area and packaging costs. Once the supply voltage is set around half of the normal supply, 
the switches are activated, providing power to the shift register loop circuit and the clock 
circuit.  The shift register loop based PUF circuit will generate the unique sequence for 
authentication depending on the initial conditions of the DFF’s.  The DFF’s in the shift 
register loop can be divided into two segments.  The initial conditions on one segment’s 
DFF’s are determined by random mismatches, while the initial conditions of DFF’s in the 
other ‘Comma’ segment are previously determined by size configurations. 
The designed PUF circuit will generate 64 random bits for each IC. However, the 
efficient number of bits for authentication doesn’t need to be exact 64. For authentication, a 
very strong PUF which generates same 64 bits of code in different tests is not necessary. 
Because of the noise or temperature variations, there could be several bits from a PUF circuit 
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varied in different test. If a code sequence from a customer and a code in the database are 
close enough, or critically saying the hamming distance between them is smaller than a 
tolerated hamming distance, the device from the customer will be authenticated. The 
hamming distance is defined as the number of bits different from two code sequences, 
2
1 2( )N i iH b b   . 
In this chapter, the detailed implementation and statistical analysis of the 
authentication under circuit will be discussed. 
5.1.1 Supply threshold trigger circuit 
The threshold trigger circuit is a circuit which produces a control signal to turn on the 
PMOS switches when the supply is around half of the normal ‘Vdd’ and turn off the switch 
when the supply is at the normal level. The threshold trigger circuit is designed by exploiting 
the threshold property of the inverter. The schematic in Fig.2 shows the implementation of 
this threshold trigger circuit. 
As shown in Figure 5-2, the first stage of the threshold trigger circuit is a voltage 
divider including two NMOS transistors which are sized such that the output of the stage is 
lower than half of the supply voltage (VDD) when VDD is low, but is higher than half of the 
supply voltage when VDD is higher than some value.  
 The second stage and third stage consists of two inverters to create the required 
trigger signals. The inverter constructed by M3 and M4 has a threshold voltage around half of 
‘VDD’. As shown in Figure 5-3, when the supply voltage is low, the signal ‘V0’ is lower 
than the threshold voltage of the inverter constructed by M3 and M4. Therefore, the signal 
‘V1’ will follow the supply voltage. As the supply voltage continues to increase, the signal 
‘V0’ becomes larger than the threshold voltage of the inverter constructed by M3 and M4, 
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thus V1 decreases. When the supply voltage is large enough, and V1 is smaller than the 
threshold voltage of the third inverter, the third inverter will change its state from low to 
high. For the supply threshold trigger circuit implemented in this paper, the threshold voltage 
is around 900mV. When the supply voltage is normal value with 1.2V in this process, the 
output of this threshold circuit is high. When the supply voltage is 0.6V, the output voltage is 
low, and the PMOS switches in Figure 5-1 will be turned on. With the help of this circuit, the 
original COTS IC and the authentication circuit can be isolated when the supply is normal, 
and the PUF circuit can generate the unique authentication code when the applied voltage is 
half of the normal supply.  
The transistors of M1, M2 are sized with large multipliers to minimize the variations 
due to mismatches. Additionally, the threshold voltage of this trigger circuit is designed for 
around 75% of the normal supply; it has enough distance away from both 1.2V and 0.6V. 
Monte Carlo simulations have been done at room temperature to show for 200 simulations, 
the trigger voltage varies from 0.83v to 1.02V and it is still larger than the half supply and 
lower than the normal supply, as shown in Figure 5-4(a).  Simulations with temperature 
variations have also been done. In Figure 5-4(b), it shows the trigger voltage  varies from  
0.82V to 1V at temperature region from 0˚C to 80˚C. With different mismatches or at 
different temperatures, the voltage trigger circuit can guarantee to turn off the PUF circuit 
while the supply is around 1.2V and turn on the PUF circuit while the supply is around 0.6V.  

















Figure 5-2 Block Diagram of Threshold trigger Circuit 
 








Figure 5-4 (a)Monte Carlo simulation results of the threshold trigger circuit;(b) simulation 
results of the threshold trigger circuit at different temperatures 
5.1.2 PUF cell 
Several silicon-based PUF cell implementations have been well studied. One 
commonly used one is a delay-based arbiter PUF cell. The idea is to exploit the variationes in 
two ‘identical’ path delays to generate a signature bit. There are also other PUF cells based 
on variations on ring oscillator’s oscillating frequency or transistors’ threshold voltage. The 
PUF cell used here is a latch circuit with back-to-back connecter inverter structure. As shown 
in Figure 5-5, it usually constructed by two identical inverters. During the supply ramping 
up, the offset on the inverter due to random mismatches will determine the initial state at 
node ‘Q’. When the circuit is powered up, the signal at node Q can be high or low depending 
on the offset of the two inverters. During the design phase, the two inverters in the D-latch 
are designed with the same sizes. Due to process variations and mismatches, the two 
inverters would not be exactly symmetric. The offset on the two inverters will determine the 
initial condition of the latch. For each DFF, the mismatches on the inverters are random and 
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unrelated to other DFF’s. Thus, the initial condition of any latch is either high or low and is 
totally independent of other devices. Each latch has an equal probability which is 0.5 that its 
initial condition at node Q is either high or low.  
 
Figure 5-5 Latch based PUF cell 
The latch based PUF cell consumes less area and devices; most importantly it is 
inherently contained in many DFF circuit. Build the PUF circuit with DFFs based shift 
register circuit, not only the random unique signature bits can be generated with the latch 
cell, but also extra shift register circuit are not needed for the output of the PUF sequence. 
 The DFFs used in the Shift register are transmission gate-based master-slave D flip 
flop circuit which is shown in Figure 5-6. Two-phase non-overlapping clock needs to be used 
to control its operation. Depending on the clock signals, either the master latch or the slave 















Figure 5-6 The transmission gate-based D flip-flop circuit 
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5.1.3 Comma sequence and random unique sequence 
The shift register based PUF circuit is designed to have 84 DFFs in total connected 
together in a loop. Once the supply is set to 0.6V, the circuit will generate an 84-bit sequence 
cyclically. There are 64 random bits’ generation DFFs, and an extra 20 Comma bits’ 
generation DFFs. The 20 “Comma” in the loop is used to define the head of the 64-bit 
authentication sequence.  
To have a large offset and make each bit robust to noise variations, minimum sized 
transistors are used in the random bits generation DFFs.  In the 20 Comma bits DFFS, 
specially sized inverters in Figure 5-7 (c) are used to build the latch to have a predetermined 
state as shown in Figure 5-7(a) and (b). In Figure 5-7(a) and (b), the upper inverter and the 
lower inverter in the latches are switched to have latch cell with different predetermined 
state.  As shown in Figure 5-8 (a) and (b), while the supply is ramping up, the state of each 








































Figure 5-7  The DFF’s with predetermined offset; (a) DFF-zero is a  DFF with initial 
condition as zero; DFF-one is a DFF with initial condition as one;(b) the two inverters in 






Figure 5-8 Transient response during supply ramping up of the predetermined latches;(a) 
response of latch_one; (b) response of latch_zero. 
However, the random D flip-flop circuit shown in Figure 5-7, generating one or zero 
is not only determined by the offset in the latch as discuss above, but also determined by the 
clock signals. With the clock signals shown in Figure 5-9, if the DFF is powered up with 
clock phases same as at ‘t1’, the initial state at ‘Q’ is determined by the slave latch; if it is 
powered up with clock phase same as at ‘t2’, the initial state at ‘Q’ is determined by the left 
side latch but with an inversion bit; if it is turned on with clock phase same as at ‘t3’, the two 
loops in the DFF are both open and the initial state cannot be predicted. Thus, to have the 
‘Comma’ bits with a good control and be robust, the clock phases need to under control when 
the shift registrar based PUF circuit is powered up. In this design, the initial state determined 
by the slave latch are chosen to generate the ‘Comma’ bit, so the clock signals are designed 
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Figure 5-9 Two phase non-overlapping clock signals 
 
Figure 5-10 The shift register based PUF circuit 
The 20-bit ‘comma’ can be any combination of ‘0’ and ‘1’. The only concern is that it 
should not be symmetric from the head to the tail. In this implementation, the comma is 
chosen as ‘1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1’. After this sequence, it starts the 64-bit 
unique authentication sequence. The whole shift register based PUF circuit diagram is shown 






































































5.1.4 Clock generation circuit 
The built-in clock generation circuit is based on a three-stage ring oscillator circuit 
and three stage binary counter circuit.  A simplified schematic showing the implementation 
of the clock circuit is in Figure 5-11. 
The ring oscillator circuit generates a periodic sinewave signal, then two buffers are 
added to reshape the signal to a pulse wave. The transient response of the ring oscillator 
circuit and the reshaped signal are shown in Figure 5-12. To generate a 1MHz clock signal, 
three DFF’s are used to make the clock frequency 8 times slower without requiring large 
transistors in the ring oscillator circuit.  When the PMOS switch in Figure 5-1 is turned on, 




















Figure 5-11 Ring oscillator-based clock generation circuits 
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Figure 5-12 Transient response of the ring oscillator 
The binary counter is also built with transition gate based DFFs. However, in the 
three binary counter architecture, the ‘CLK’’ is generated internally and locally, the 
overlapping between ‘CLK’ and ‘CLK’’ is only around 10ps, then the issue to have all 
switches on will not be a problem to change the operation of the circuit.  Thus, in the 
frequency divider circuit, only ‘CLK’ and ‘CLK’’ are used, as shown in Figure 5-13. 
The D flip-flop circuit shown in Figure 5-7 generating one or zero is determined by 
the offset in the circuit as discuss above. But it is also determined by the clock signals.  To 
make sure the initial state on the DFFs is determined by the slave latch cell, the clock signals 
should have the same clock phase as at ‘t1’ in Figure 5-9 when the PUF circuit is turned on. 
To meet this requirement, the second and third DFFs in the frequency divider is 
designed with the circuit shown in Figure 5-13(a), constructing the frequency divider as in 
Figure 5-13(b).  The circuit named ‘DFF_one_one’ includes a ‘D_latch_zero’ as the master 
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latch and a ‘D_latch_one’ as the slave latch. At the moment when the circuit is turning on at 
t=0, no matter the slave loop or the master loop is closed first, the state at node Q is set as ‘1’. 
As shown in Figure 5-14 (a), if at the moment the second D_flip_flop turning on, signal at 
‘clk3f’ is low, then the slave latch in the second D_flip_flop of the frequency divider is 
closed and ‘clk2f’ will start from high. Otherwise, as shown in Figure 5-14 (b), the signal at 
‘clk3f’ is high, then the master latch in the second D_flip_flop is closed. ‘clk2f’ will be 
determined by the master latch. Since the master latch is latch zero, but after one inversion, 
‘clk2f’ will be ‘high’ ,too.  With a Q at ‘clk2f’ is ‘1’ in all conditions, the third DFF in the 
frequency divider will always have the slave latch on first and also generate ‘1’ at ‘clkf’ the 
moment when the supply is turning on. The ‘VDD_2f’ and ‘VDD_f’ are several nanoseconds 
delayed respectively by ‘VDD’ on the first DFF, to guarantee the clock ready earlier than the 






































Figure 5-13 The second and third  DFF design in the frequency divider;(a) The 










































Figure 5-14 The operation of the frequency divider with DFF_one_one;(a) The slave latch of 
DFF_one_one is on when circuit is turning on;(b) The master latch is on when the circuit is 
turning on. 
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With signals generated at ‘clk2f’,  ‘clkf’’,   and ‘clkf ’, the two-phase nonoverlapping 
clocks can be generated by the circuit shown in Figure 5-15. It will guarantee the slave latch 
in the PUF/shift register circuit will be closed first when the circuit is turning on. 
 
Figure 5-15 Nonoverlapping clock generation circuit 
5.2 Simulation results 
The under-circuit was designed in an IBM 0.13um process with a normal supply 
voltage of 1.2V. The circuit has been simulated using Monte Carlo transient tools in Spectre 
to verify its operation. Two transient simulation results of the shift register that show one 
cycle of the 20-bit comma and the first 15 bits of the random sequence are shown in Figure 
5-16. The date sequences in all the simulation results have the same 20-bit ‘Comma’ 












 1 0 1 0  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0  1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1  
20 bit comma sequence
 0 0 1 0  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0  1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 1  1 0 0  
20 bit comma sequence
 
Figure 5-16 Parts of two simulation results 
5.3 Statistical analysis 
5.3.1 Distribution of latch state 
As exploited in this paper, the physical mismatches on the minimum sized inverters 
determine the initial state when the latch turns on.  However, it is not easy to analyze the 
distribution of the latch state directly, because the state is determined during the supply 
ramping up period. At the moment when the state is determined, the operation of transistors 
is uncertain.  
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The state in another structure shown in Figure 5-17 (a) can be analyzed. When 
0<t<t1, the circuit are two separated self-biased inverters as shown in Figure 5-17(b). The 
voltage at node B and node A are the tripping points of the two inverters’. When t=t1, the 
inverter’s gate capacitor will maintain the same voltage as 0<t<t1. When t>t1, the circuit is 
just the latch cell used in our PUF circuit. The voltage at node B and node A are the state of 




























Figure 5-17  A circuit combined with two inverters and operating at two phases 
If VM1 >VM2,  
When t>t1, the signal at node B will start to increase because of the signal at node A 
is VM1; at the meantime, the signal at node A starts to decrease because of the signal at node 
B is VM2. Thus, the positive feedback loop in this latch cell will speed up this process 
keeping signal at node B increased to VDD, and signal at node A decreased to Gnd. 
If VM1<VM2, 
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An inverse process will occur. Signal at node B will be Gnd and signal at node A will 
be VDD. 
If VM1=VM2=VM, 
Signal at node B and node A will always maintain as VM if no noise present. 
Without noise consideration, verified by 10 simulations, same state can be achieved 
as the analysis above in the circuit show in Figure 5-18 which is the latch cell used in our 
PUF circuit. Thus, we assume the state in the two circuits have the same distribution 
characteristics. Thus the state Q on the latch in Figure 5-18 can be formulated as a function 





1             VM1-VM2>0
VM        VM1=VM2=VM
0             VM1-VM2<0
 
Figure 5-18 Latch cell and the state of Q 
Define 1 2M M
Voffset V V 
 ,                                                                      (5-1) 
Thus, the distribution of Q can be calculated by the distribution of ‘Voffset’. 
At t=t1, assuming both PMOS and NMOS transistors are in the saturation region and 
conducting the same amount of current. The tripping point of the inverter can be calculated 
as Equations (5-2). With randomness analysis, the distribution of ‘Voffset’ can be calculated 
by Equations (5-3) to (5-14). 
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Assuming, the threshold voltage effects dominate the offset. 
In this design, 1
n oxn n pn
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In the latch cell, the two inverters’ tripping point have the same distribution 
characteristics, and same normal value, thus,   
                                  1 2 1 2 1 2M M os MN os MN os osVoffset V V V V V V V V                      (5-12) 
Assuming, the two inverters’ offset are iid,      
2 22
offsetV os
                           (5-13) 
                                                          0.07296
offsetV
V                                            (5-14)                                      
The distribution of ‘Voffset’ is plotted in Figure 5-19. Based on the distribution of 
‘Voffset’, the distribution of ‘Q’ can be calculated. Q is a function of a binomial distribution 
and with a probability as 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 5-19 Distribution of ‘Voffset’ 
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5.3.2 Robustness of single bit 
The distribution analysis of ‘Q’ is analyzed under the condition assumption that there 
is no noise present. However, if there is flicker and thermal noise existing in the circuit, the 
state of a device may vary from each test. Assuming a commercial device commonly used for 
5 years, the 
_noise rmsV  can be calculated by integrating the total noise. Noise simulation has 
been done on the minimum sized inverters on Figure 5-20 (a). As shown in Figure 5-20 (b), 
the thermal noise has been filtered out after 1GHz. Integrating the noise from 
96.34 10  Hz 
to 1GHz, the total  noise are calculated, as in Equation (5-15) and (5-16). 
                           2 6 2, 2.591 10n noiseV V
                                                       (5-15) 








Figure 5-20 Inverter noise simulation results 
In the real latch cell, if the noise is larger than the ‘Voffset’, the state of latch cell may 
be different in two tests, since the initial state will be impacted by noise; however, if the 
noise is much smaller than the ‘Voffset’, the state of latch cell will always be same in 
different tests since the initial state is dominated by ‘Voffset’. With the distribution of 
‘Voffset’ and noise, the robust bit and non-robust bit can be defined. Assuming the noise 
varies from -3Vrms to 3Vrms, the non-robust bit can be defined as when |offset| is lower than 
3Vrms, while the robust bit is defined as when |offset| is larger than 3 rmsV .  Thus the robust 
probability for one single bit can be calculated as Equation (5-17). 
                                                  ( ) 0.9471P r                                                       (5-17)               
While the non-robust probability for one single bit is (5-18). 




5.3.3 Statistical analysis of the PUF circuits 
If a code sequence from a customer’ device has a hamming distance to a code in the 
database smaller than the tolerated hamming distance, the device is authenticated. Thus, to do 
authentication, a tolerated hamming distance need to be determined. In this section, a 
statistical analysis is done showing the strategy to determine the tolerated hamming distance. 
5.3.3.1 Intra hamming distance 
Intra hamming distance: Defined as the number of bits in a PUF response different 
from a repeated generation in the same device.  It is a measure of the reproducibility of a 
PUF code generation. 
In one PUF device, if bit ‘ i  ’ is different in two different tests
1 2( ) ( )D i D i , the 
hamming distance increases by one.  
The probability of a single bit is different at two tests in one PUF circuit is: 
                    
1 2 1( ( ) ( ) ) 0.0529 0.02645
2
iovP D i D i P                                     (5-19) 
The probability of n bits different at the two tests in one device (or the probability of 
intra hamming distance as n) is: 
                          
 6464( ) (1 )
nn
ihd n iov iovP P P

                                           (5-20) 
The plot in Figure 5-21 is visually showing the Equation (5-20). There is a high 
probability that the intra hamming distance is less than 4. The intra hamming distance which 
is larger than 4 becomes very small.  The probability for one PUF circuit to have at least 60 
bits same in two different tests is 0.973. Thus, the proposed PUF circuit has a very good 
robust characteristic and there is a high probability to have at least 60 bits same in two 
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different tests. Based on this analysis, the tolerated hamming distance can be set as small as 
4, which means when the hamming distance is no larger than 4 between the code from the 
customer device and the database, the device will be authenticated.  
 
Figure 5-21The probability of different intra hamming distance in one device 
5.3.3.2 Intra hamming distance 
Inter hamming distance: Defined as the number of bits in a PUF response different 
from another PUF response in a different device. It is a measure of the uniqueness of an 
individual PUF circuit. 
The probability function in Equation (5-21) plotted in Figure 5-22 shows the 
probability density of the different possible hamming distance in two different devices. As 
shown in Figure 5-22, the average inter hamming distance in this design is 32. The 
probability for having very low or very high inter hamming distance in two devices is small.  
If the tolerated hamming distance is set too large, the authentication’s uniqueness will lose. 
148 
For example, if the tolerated hamming distance is set as 32, the probability to authenticate a 
device to another device is 0.5, which is too large.  






n ii nP                                                               (5-21) 
 
Figure 5-22 The probability of different inter hamming distance for two devices 
To keep the uniqueness of the code sequence, the probability of the inter hamming 
distance in two devices smaller than the tolerated hamming distance which is defined as 
confused rate in the following section, should be small. Otherwise, it will be wrongly 
authenticated to another device. For different tolerated hamming distance N, the probability 
for the confused authentication in two devices is calculated by Equation (5-22) and plotted in 
Figure 5-23.  The confused authentication means, the code sequences from the two devices 
are within the tolerated hamming distance, thus it cannot tell which code in the database 
comes from which device. 
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                                        (5-22) 
 
Figure 5-23 The rate for confused authentication for two devices 
As shown in Figure 5-23, if the tolerated hamming distance is large, the rate to have 
confused authentication will be more close to 1. With a lower tolerated hamming distance, 
the rate to have confused authentication is smaller.  In this project, if the tolerated hamming 
distance is set as 14, the confused rate is 63.5347 10  by Equation (5-23) which is very low. 
With the tolerated hamming distance as 14, if the 64-bit code from a customer’s device has at 
least 50 bits same as a code in the database, the device is authenticated. 











                                                (5-23) 
For two devices, with 14 as the tolerated hamming distance, the probability to have 
confused authentication is low. However, if the total number of products is large, the 
probability to have two devices with a hamming distance smaller than the tolerated hamming 
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distance will also increase. Assuming for one fixed sequence code from a device, the 
probability for another device to have at least 50 bits same as this fixed code is calculated by 
Equation (5-24). 













                                         (5-24) 
Among the total products of which the number is ‘M’, the probability to have more 
than one device with at least 50 bits same as the code sequence from a device  at different 
‘M’ is calculated by Equation (5-25) and plotted in Figure 5-24. 
                                       1_ _ 501 (1 )
M
confused in M bitsF P
                                      (5-25) 
 
Figure 5-24 The number of products VS the rate of confused authentication with tolerated 
hamming distance as 14 
As shown in Figure 5-24, the rate of having at least two confused authentication 
devices will increase as the number of products increases. If the tolerated hamming distance 
is 14 as shown in Figure 5-24, with the total number of products as ten thousands, the rate of 
confused authentication is 0.03. 
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Different tolerated hamming distance will result different functions of the confused 
rate and the total number of products. To generate large number of devices, and have a low 
rate of confused authentication, the tolerated hamming distance need to be set smaller. For 
example, if the hamming distance is set as 8, the probability of one PUF with at least 56 bits 
same as another device is much smaller, shown in Equation (5-26). 













                                        (5-26) 
With 8 as the tolerated hamming distance, the number of products VS the probability 
of having at least two products with at least 56 bits same in the total devices is plotted in 
Figure 5-25 and expressed by Equation (5-27). 
                 1_ _ 561 (1 )
M
confused in M bitsF P
                                                               (5-27) 
 
Figure 5-25 The number of products VS the rate of confused authentication with tolerated 
hamming distance as 8 
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As shown in Figure 5-25, when the tolerated hamming distance is 8, the rate of 
confused authentication comes to very low even when the total number of products is over 
hundreds thousand.   
As analysis above, the tolerated hamming distance can be set based on the inter 
hamming distance and the intra hamming distance. With the inter hamming distance analysis, 
it’s known that the tolerated hamming distance should be set larger than 4 to lower the 
probability of missing authentication to a right device.  With the intra hamming distance 
analysis, it’s known that the tolerated hamming distance should be chosen based on the 
number of products and the rate of confused authentication. If the number of products is 
around hundred thousand, the tolerated hamming distance can be chosen as large as 8 but still 
with a very a good uniqueness rate for authentication. Actually, in real case, a very good 
uniqueness may not be an important concern. Even there are some confused devices, 
compared to the earrings, the loss to throw away some confused devices is too low.  Thus, a 





CHAPTER 6.    CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the research work in this dissertation is focused on analog hardware 
security and hardware authentication. A type of power/area/architecture/ signature 
transparent analog hardware Trojan is analyzed. Example circuits showing the PAAST 
characteristics are given. Detecting methods focusing on Trojan in static and dynamic analog 
circuits are proposed. A PUF circuit built with sub threshold under circuit is designed for 
circuit authentication. The proposed circuit architecture for authentication doesn’t need any 
extra pins besides the pins necessary for the original IC.  
In Chapter 2, it shows example circuits with Trojan states served by extra operating 
points or modes. These Trojan can exist in both static circuit and dynamic circuit; they can be 
in the frequency domain, phase domain or voltage amplitude domain; and they are also 
Power/Area/Architecture and Signature Transparent. Hence, they are extremely challenging 
to detect with state of art simulation and verification tools or existing hardware Trojan 
detection methods even if a complete and accurate disclosure of the circuit is given. These 
Trojans can be readily embedded in some of the most basic analog and mixed-signal circuit 
structures. Irrespective of whether PAAST Trojans are accidentally or maliciously inserted or 
Triggered, the presence of these Trojans can cause disastrous results.  Additionally, three 
temperature signatures of multiple equilibriums in inverse Widlar circuit is observed. Base 
on the type 2 signature, a tiny temperature trigger circuit is designed. 
In Chapter 3, due to the temperature sensitive characteristics, a bi-directional 
temperature sweeping method detecting the existence of undesired operating points is 
proposed. By doing a bi-directional temperature sweeping simulation, a hysteresis window 
can be observed if at low temperature and high temperature the circuit has worked at two 
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different operating points. Application of this method on many different circuits has shown 
that it works well on almost all the circuits, except those with isolated equilibrium points in 
the temperature domain. But if combined with other methods, the temperature sweeping 
method is still efficient to speed up the verification process. Additionally, a one-dimensional 
initial condition scanning method for identifying the presence or absence of Trojan stationary 
dynamic modes of operation in nonlinear dynamic circuits was introduced for dynamic 
circuits. It is based upon a sequence of transient simulations whereby the initial conditions 
for each transient simulation are elements of a finite scan set. By scanning the initial 
conditions, at least one point in the domain of convergence for each orbit of the circuit can be 
reached.  This method works efficient on second order dynamic circuits and it can also detect 
the existence of Trojan modes in higher order systems.  
In Chapter 4, it introduces a side-channel trigger mechanism which can be used to 
trigger analog circuits with PAAST Trojans into an undesired redundant stationary mode 
during its normal operation.   Since these side-channel triggers doesn’t need any extra circuit 
inserted to the original system or any extra interconnects among the original blocks, it won’t 
consume more power, take more area, or have any circuit architecture modification, current 
signature vaiation in the supply bus or delay variation in the timing path. The trigger 
mechanism is also PAAST.  Measurement results of two dynamic circuits with multiple 
operating modes are also given for demonstration of PAAST Trojans’ existence. 
In Chapter 5, a shift register PUF based undercircuit which can operate at half supply 
to generate a unique key for IC authentication purposes has been proposed. It has no 
interaction with the COTS IC during normal operation. By dual-purposing three pins of the 
original IC, it requires no extra pins. When the circuit is implemented underneath existing 
155 
bonding PADs, it consumes no extra die area. Additionally, statistical analysis has been done 
to show the strategy to determine the tolerated hamming distance.  
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